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SUMMARY
The intent of this dissertation is to generate a set of non-dominated finite-
memory policies from which one of two agents (the leader) can select a most preferred
policy to control a dynamic system that is also affected by the control decisions of
the other agent (the follower). The problem is described by an infinite horizon total
discounted reward, partially observed Markov game (POMG). Each agents policy as-
sumes that the agent knows its current and recent state values, its recent actions, and
the current and recent possibly inaccurate observations of the other agents state. For
each candidate finite-memory leader policy, we assume the follower, fully aware of the
leader policy, determines a policy that optimizes the followers criterion. The leader-
follower assumption allows the POMG to be transformed into a specially structured,
partially observed Markov decision process that we use to determine the followers
best response policy for a given leader policy. We then present a value determination
procedure to evaluate the performance of the leader for a given leader policy, based
on which non-dominated set of leader polices can be selected by existing heuristic
approaches.
We then analyze how the value of the leaders criterion changes due to changes in
the leaders quality of observation of the follower. We give conditions that insure
improved observation quality will improve the leaders value function, assuming that
changes in the observation quality do not cause the follower to change its policy.
We show that discontinuities in the value of the leader criterion, as a function of
observation quality, can occur when the change of observation quality is significant
enough for the follower to change its policy. We present conditions that determine
xi
when a discontinuity may occur and conditions that guarantee a discontinuity will not
degrade the leaders performance. This framework has been used to develop a dynamic
risk analysis approach for U.S. food supply chains and to compare and create supply




Models of sequential decision-making under uncertainty provide a rich normative
framework for one or more intelligent decision-makers to improve, e.g., optimize,
the operation of a system subject to control over a horizon containing a sequence
of decision epochs. The solutions of such models can provide guidance as to how
decision-makers should select actions, based on currently available data, in order to
achieve their objectives. At each decision epoch, each decision-maker selects an ac-
tion that: (1) accrues an immediate reward dependent on the current state of the
system and the current actions taken by all of the decision-makers and (2) affects
what the state of the system will be at the next decision epoch. Each decision-maker
must balance how its decision has impact on the immediate reward accrued and how
its decision will affect rewards to be accrued in the future, based on all currently
available data. If there are multiple decision-makers, each decision-maker must also
consider how the decisions of the other decision makers will have impact on its ability
to achieve its goals.
State observations on which decision-makers base their decisions may be inaccurate
or imperfect measures of the system state. There are two extremes of observation
quality:
• The completely observed case, where the observation data provide an accurate
description of the current state of the system;
• The completely unobserved case, where the observation data are unrelated to
the current state of the system and hence are uninformative.
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Models of sequential decision-making that assume the state is completely observed
are typically considerably more computationally tractable than models of sequen-
tial decision-making that assume the state is partially observed. However, partially
observed problem formulations often represent more realistic models of real world
decision-making situations.
With respect to the number of decision-making agents and the accuracy of state
observations available to the agents, there are four possible cases:
• Single-agent completely observed decision-making;
• Multi-agent completely observed decision-making;
• Single-agent partially observed decision-making;
• Multi-agent partially observed decision-making.
Each of these four cases will be described and its literature will be reviewed in the
following subsections. This section will then conclude with the outline and main
contributions of the dissertation.
1.1 Completely Observed Single-Agent Decision Making
The Markov decision process (MDP) is an important and well-studied optimization
model of discrete stage, completely observed single agent sequential decision making
in a stochastic environment. The MDP has been widely applied to problems in auto-
mated control, manufacturing processes, healthcare, etc (Banerjee and Gupta 2013;
Li and Sun 2013; Peters et al. 2015; Moulik et al. 2014). Many rich and elegant
theoretical and computational advances have been achieved over the past decades.
A MDP consists of decision epochs, a state space, an action space, a reward struc-
ture, a criterion, and transition probabilities. A formal definition of a MDP can be
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found in many standard textbooks (Bellman, 1957; Bertsekas, 1987; Denardo, 1982;
Howard 1960; Puterman 1994). The expected total discounted reward criterion for
the infinite horizon is the focus throughout this dissertation. Details on average ex-
pected reward models and recent developments can be found in White and Scherer
(1987), Puterman (1994), Cavazos-Cadena (1989, 1992), Feinberg and Park (1994),
Meyn (1997), Bertsekas (1998), Lewis and Puterman (2001), and Shlakhter (2010).
Standard solution procedures for the infinite horizon discounted case include value
iteration and its variants, (modified) policy iteration (with action elimination), and
linear programming (Puterman 1994). Reward revision (White, Thomas and Scherer
1985) is another technique that can solve the infinite horizon problem efficiently by
constructing a sequence of MDPs that share the same fixed point as the original
problem. The sequence of MDPs is constructed by periodic revisions of its reward
structure.
Recent algorithms for large scale MDPs aim to improve the performance of value and
policy iteration by eliminating redundant or useless backup steps and/or generating a
good backup ordering so that the transition matrix can be in a computationally use-
ful form (for example, triangular matrices) (Barto, Bradtke and Singh, 1995; Hansen
and Zilberstein 2001; Wingate and Seppi, 2005; McMahan and Gordon, 2005; Sanner
et al., 2009; Dai, Weld and Goldsmith 2011). Another type of solution technique is
based on state aggregation to approximate the original problem by a MDP having a
smaller state space and/or action space (White and White 1989; Roy 2006; Jia 2011).
The multiobjective MDP is an extension of the MDP where there are multiple, possi-
bly conflicting objectives under consideration. Chatterjee, Majumdar and Henzinger
(2006) showed that the Pareto optimal can be achieved by a randomized memoryless
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policy and the Pareto frontier can be approximated in polynomial time. Viswanathan,
Aggarwal and Nair (1977), Hernandez-Lerma and Romera (2004) and Chatterjee
(2006) reformulate the multiobejctive MDP as a multi-objective linear programming.
White and Kim (1980) solved the problem by reformulating it as a specially struc-
tured partially observed MDP. Wakuta (1995) combined Fourier elimination with a
policy iteration algorithm to compute all optimal stationary policies. Futher discus-
sion of the multiobjective MDP can be found in Roijers et al. (2013).
For many applications, the rewards and the transition probabilities can be very dif-
ficult to quantify precisely (Wiesemann, Kuhn and Rustem 2013). For parameter
imprecision associated with the reward structure, White and EL-Deib (1986) studied
MDPs having a reward function that is affine in an imprecise parameter. Both a
successive approximations procedure for the finite horizon case and a policy iteration
procedure for the infinite horizon problem were developed. Tan and Hartman (2011)
studied how multiple parameters in the reward function can vary while maintaining
the optimality of the current solution.
For parameter imprecision associated with imprecise transition probabilities, White
and EL-Deib (1994) described the imprecise transition probabilities by a finite number
of linear inequalities and developed solution procedures based on successive approx-
imations, reward revision, and modified policy iteration. Nilim and Ghaoui (2005)
characterized imprecise transition structures in terms of nonconvex sets, presented a
duality result, and demonstrated that the problem can be solved by robust dynamic
programming. Delage and Mannor (2010) presented a chance-constrained formulation
of the MDP with imprecise parameters in either the reward structure or transition
probabilities and studied the effect of this uncertainty on the criterion value. Other re-
lated work can be found in Iyengar (2005) and Delgado, Sanner and De Barros (2011).
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1.2 Completely Observed Multi-Agent Decision Making
Markov games, also called stochastic games, are generalizations of MDPs that involve
a group of agents (also called players) such as a team of robots or several competitors
(or collaborators) with different objectives. The Markov game was first introduced
by Shapley (1953). At each decision epoch, each player selects an action simulta-
neously with and independently from all other players. The game evolves to a new
state depending on the current state and the joint actions of all decision makers. The
Markov game model extends the MDP and game-theoretic frameworks to determine
policies for players in which rewards and transitions are determined by the simulta-
neous actions of all players. This type of game requires no hidden information and
all players have complete and perfect information all the time.
The overwhelming focus for the Markov game is on the Markov perfect equilibrium
(MPE), an equilibrium where players’ policies are Markov policies. Rogers (1969)
and Sobel (1971) established an existence result for the Markov game with a finite
number of states and actions. For this type of game, they showed that the Markov
game has an equilibrium in stationary Markov policies via a routine application of
Kakutani’s theorem. This existence theorem has been extended to countable state
spaces in Parthasarathy (1982) and Rieder (1979). Chakrabarti (1999) proved the
existence of the MPE and the semi-MPE for a Markov game having a complete sep-
arable state space and compact action spaces for each player. Dutta and Sundaram
(1992) studied the existence of the MPE for pure policies for the discounted game
and the limiting behavior of the MPE as the discount factor tends to unity. The
equilibrium existence problem for the general Markov game was reviewed by Dutta
and Sundaram (1998). Related properties of MPE can be found in Doraszelski and
5
Escobar (2010) and Haller and Lagunoff (2000).
A zero-sum Markov game with a finite number of states and actions can be solved
by value iteration or policy iteration, analogous to the MDP (Littman 1996). The
general-sum Markov game can be solved via nonlinear programming (Filar and Vrieze
1997).
1.3 Partially Observed Single-Agent Decision Making
A partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) extends the framework of
the standard Markov decision process to situations where an agent only has noisy
observations of the system state. The POMDP formalism has successfully extended
the applications of MDPs to many realistic problems such as machine maintenance,
behavioral ecology, network troubleshooting, hostile target identification, and medical
diagnosis (Cassandra 1998).
A POMDP is comprised of the state space S, action space A, observation space Z,
transition probability matrices {P a}a∈A, observation probability matrices {Qa} and
reward function r : S × A → R (White 1991). This thesis only considers the case
where the state space S, the observation space Z, and the action space A are finite.
The generality of the POMDP has computational implications. Papadimitriou and
Tsitsiklis (1987) prove that finding optimal policies for finite-horizon POMDPs is
PSPACE-complete, and Madani, Hanks and Condon (1999) show that the existence of
optimal policies for infinite-horizon POMDPs is undecidable. Existing classical exact
algorithms are developed based on the fact that the value function vt is piecewise linear
and concave with respect to its sufficient statistic (or belief point x = P (s(t)|I(t)), s(t)
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is the current state and I(t) includes all past observations z(t), ...z(1) and actions
a(t− 1), ..., a(0)) at each decision epoch t (Sondik 1971, 1978).
There are two types of classical exact algorithms. The first type is to systematically
construct the value function vt piece by piece from Γt+1 by successive approximation.
This type first identifies a proper subset Γ̄t of Γt to approximate the value function
vt and then searches for the belief points x where this approximation is not accu-
rate. These belief points are often called witness points W . The value function vt
is updated at these witness points, and the resulting optimal γ vectors are added to
Γ̄t. Thus, the cardinality of Γ̄t is strictly increasing until Γ̄t = Γt. Since there are
only finitely many γ vectors in Γt, the algorithm stops after a finite number of itera-
tions (Cassandra 1994). Algorithms of this type include Sondik’s one-pass algorithm
(Sondik 1971, Smallwood and Sondik 1973), Cheng’s algorithms (Cheng 1988), and
the witness algorithm (Littman 1994).
The second type of approach first constructs all possible γ vectors that could describe
the value function in order to form a superset Γ̄t, Γ̄t ⊇ Γt (Cassandra 1994). A vector
γ that is necessary to define the value function is called a defining vector. The small-
est set of defining vectors Γt is often called the minimal representation of the value
function (Lin, Bean and White, 1998, 2004). The main objective of this type of algo-
rithm is to effectively identify these defining vectors and remove all redundant vectors
using a so-called PURGE operator (Lin, Bean and White 1998, 2004). A geometric
interpretation of the PURGE operator is to identify extreme points of a convex hull
of a point set to find the minimum representation of the value function (Zhang 2010).
Algorithms of this type include the Monahan/Lark algorithm (Monahan 1982, White
1991), the (Generalized) Incremental pruning algorithm (Cassandra, Littman, Zhang
1997; Naser-Moghadasi 2010, 2012) and the Hybrid genetic/optimization algorithm
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(Lin, Bean and White 1998, 2004). The latter two algorithms are used in this thesis
to solve POMDP problems.
A finite state controller is comprised of a finite set of internal states ( called “control
states”), action rules and transition rules (Zhang 2010). Hansen’s policy iteration
algorithm is designed to search for an optimal finite state controller (Hansen 1998).
This algorithm is guaranteed to converge to an ε-optimal finite-state controller in a
finite number of iterations, and it will be optimal if the finite state controller cannot
be further improved.
A finite memory controller is a suboptimal design. It is a mapping from the set of
finite recent histories h(t, τ) into the action space A, where τ is a design parameter for
the maximum memory length and h(t, τ) = {z(t), a(t− 1), z(t− 1), a(t− 2), ..., z(t−
τ + 1), a(t− τ)}. The corresponding γ vector for a finite memory controller has been
computed by Ortiz, Erera and White (2013) and White and Scherer(1994).
A finite memory controller can be easily represented as a finite state controller in
which an internal state corresponds to a finite recent history h(t− τ). A finite mem-
ory controller can be in some cases an optimal finite state controller. White and
Scherer (1994) constructed lower and upper bounds for value functions of finite mem-
ory controllers and showed that a finite memory controller is an optimal finite state
controller if P (h(t, τ)) is of rank 1. However, there are examples that show a finite
state controller cannot be represented by any finite memory controller ∀τ < ∞ (Yu
2007).
The point-based POMDP, first suggested by Lovejoy (1991), is considered a very im-
portant contribution to POMDP research because it can approximately solve large
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POMDPs rapidly. It maintains an approximate value function over a finite subset
of the belief space in order to avoid the exponential growth of γ vectors that define
a value function. An extensive literature review of point-based POMDP algorithms
can be found in Shani, Pineau and Kaplow (2013). Many point-based algorithms
can continually improve the approximation of the value function over time and can
be terminated to obtain an approximate near optimal policy based on a given time
constraint.
1.4 Partially Observed Multi-agent Decision Making
Partially observed multi-agent decision making frameworks involve multiple intelli-
gent and adaptive decision makers, each of which can choose actions that affect the
dynamics of the system, based on current and past possibly inaccurate state obser-
vations.
The I-POMDP is a generalization of the POMDP to a multiagent setting. The I-
POMDP defines the possible models of all agents and includes these agents in the de-
scription of the system (Gmytrasiewicz and Doshi 2005). The I-POMDP extends the
concept of the system state to include the other agents’ models, and these extended
states are called interactive states (Gmytrasiewicz and Doshi 2005). In a manner
similar to the POMDP, the agent’s belief over these interactive states is a sufficient
statistic and the value function is piecewise linear and convex with respect to this
belief. However, a belief over interactive states is also a part of other agents’ models.
Hence, the belief is infinitely nested so that the I-POMDP can not be solved exactly
(Gmytrasiewicz and Doshi 2005). Current solution techniques for the I-POMDP in-
clude policy iteration (Sonu and Doshi 2012), point based value iteration (Doshi and
Perez, 2008), and interactive particle filtering (Doshi and Gmytraslewicz 2009).
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The decentralized partially observable Markov decision process (DEC-POMDP) is
a framework for planning for groups of cooperative agents in a stochastic and par-
tially observable environment, where all the agents share the same reward function.
Contrary to the single agent POMDP, the DEC-POMDP in general cannot provide
the entire information needed for the whole group to select an action, although the
agents are collaborating with each other. The reason is that an agent only knows its
local observation Zi but not the complete observation vector Z = {Zi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N}(N
is the number of agents), and each agent has to choose its action ai based on its
own history of actions taken and observations received so far. The goal of the DEC-
POMDP is to search for a joint policy π = {π1, ...πN} which maximizes the total
discounted reward for the group. However, solving finite horizon DEC-POMDPs is
provably NEXP-complete (Bernstein et al. 2002) and even computing solutions with
absolutely bounded error is also NEXP-complete (Rabinovich, Goldman and Rosen-
schein 2003).
One way to solve the DEC-POMDP is to introduce a communication channel to the
group of agents so that the agents can communicate with each other about observa-
tions and actions. If the agents can communicate without limit and at no cost, then
every agent can receive observations and actions from all of its teammates at each
decision epoch. Consequently, free communication reduces the DEC-POMDP to a
centralized single agent decision making problem, which can be solved by standard
POMDP techniques. However, in reality communication is not free or unlimited, and
a model that assumes free communication might not be realistic. To overcome this
issue, Emery-Montemerlo et al. (2004), Roth, Simmons and Veloso (2005) and Nair
et al. (2004) first solved the large centralized POMDP as if communication were
truly free, and each agent executes the resulting joint policy in a distributed system
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with communication constraints; Xuan, Lesser and Zilberstein (2001), Goldman and
Zilberstein (2003) and Spaan, Gordon and Vlassis (2006) incorporate the communi-
cation decisions into the agent’s policy.
The past ten years have enjoyed significant success in the development of both exact
algorithms and approximation algorithms for the DEC-POMDP. For the finite hori-
zon DEC-POMDP, existing exact algorithms include dynamic programming (Hansen,
Bernstein and Zilberstein 2004; Boularias and Chaib-Draa 2008; Amato, Dibangoye
and Zilberstein 2009), linear programming (Aras and Dutech 2010), and heuristic
search (Dibangoye et al. 2013). However, these approaches become quickly intractable
due to their complexity. Specifically, the number of policies grows doubly exponen-
tially as the number of decision epochs increases, and hence the models become
computationally intractable quickly as the problem size grows. No exact solution has
been found yet for the infinite-horizon DEC-POMDP in the current literature (Bern-
stein et al. 2009; Dibangoye, Mouaddib and Chaib-Draa 2011). A detailed review
of existing DEC-POMDP models, solution procedures and complexity results can be
found in Seuken and Zilberstein (2005), Oliehoek (2012) and Amato et al. (2013).
The DEC-POMDP is a cooperative version of a partially observed stochastic game
(POSG) where each agent may have different objectives. The POSG framework is
very general and very challenging computationally. So far, the POSG is still a rel-
atively unexamined research area, and the literature on POSGs is relatively sparse.
Hansen, Bernstein and Zilberstein (2004) have pointed out that it is not possible to
solve a POSG by transforming it into a completely observable stochastic game over
the belief states.
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A dynamic programming approach (Hansen, Bernstein and Zilberstein 2004) was de-
veloped to produce optimal policies for cooperative POSGs, i.e., the DEC-POMDPs.
However, the size of the policy sets for each agent increases doubly exponentially
in the horizon t, |Ai||Oi|
t
, so that the dynamic programming approach cannot solve
problems with large horizons (Hansen, Bernstein and Zilberstein 2004). A bounded
approximation technique has been attempted by Kumar and Zilberstein (2009) to
scale the POSG by several orders of magnitude. However, the dynamic programming
approach still cannot be used to compute optimal policies for general POSGs.
Because of the difficulty in solving the general POSG, much work has been done on
POSGs with special structure. The two-player zero-sum partially observed stochastic
game is an active research area. Ghosh, McDonald and Sinha (2004) transformed
a zero-sum stochastic game with partial information into an equivalent problem
with complete information. Saha (2014) considered a partially observable zero-sum
stochastic game with average payoff criterion. A survey of zero-sum POSGs can be
found in Chatterjee, Doyen and Henzinger(2013). Dermed, Isbell and Weiss (2011)
approximated POSGs by Markov games of incomplete information, which can be con-
verted into a completely observed stochastic game. Approximate algorithms for the
infinite horizon general POSG have not been presented in the literature.
1.5 Outline and Contributions
This dissertation presents and analyzes models of a sequential stochastic game involv-
ing two decision-makers. These models extend the existing literature on stochastic
games by explicitly considering the strategic interaction over time of two non-myopic
agents, a leader and a follower, each of whom adjust its decisions according to the
other agent’s decisions for the case where neither agent has complete information
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about the other agent. The agents can be cooperative, non-cooperative, or a mixture
of both. Multi-objective optimization is also introduced to enable multi-attribute
decision making. This dissertation also contributes to the analysis of the value of
information for this class of sequential stochastic games in order to better inform the
decision to seek or not seek improved state observation quality and what resulting
changes in performance to expect if state observation quality is improved in the multi-
agent decision making framework. We apply our results to a situation involving the
management of a food processing facility subject to a possible attack from an indi-
vidual (or group of individuals) intent on contaminating the food with a biological
or chemical toxin. Thus, the results presented in this dissertation also contribute
to how risk can be measured and managed, assuming two intelligent and adaptive
decision-makers, and hence to the risk and decision analysis literature.
The dissertation is organized into three main chapters. The first of these chapters
(Chapter II) presents a model of and analyzes a leader-follower, multi-objective par-
tially observed infinite horizon Markov game, where it is assumed that the follower
selects its policy with complete knowledge of the policy selected by the leader. We
show how the results of this POMG can be used to support decision-making involv-
ing a leader having multiple objectives. The second of these chapters (Chapter III)
considers the single objective version of the problem considered in Chapter II and in-
vestigates the impact of how accurately the leader observes the follower’s state on the
performance of the leader, thus representing an analysis of the value of information
for this class of POMGs. The third of these chapters (Chapter IV) applies the results
of the first two chapters in order to quantify the risk of a food production facility
to an intelligent and adaptive adversary intent on delivering a chemical or biological
toxin to the general population through use of the food supply chain. The goal of
this chapter is to develop a new model of dynamic risk analysis that can explicitly
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describe the strategic interaction between two intelligent and adaptive agents with
different objectives, and to provide decision support to the defender as to when and
what action should be taken in order to achieve the defender’s (possibly multiple)
objectives.
We now provide a more detailed description of the results found in these three chap-
ters. Chapter II presents a model of and analyzes a leader-follower, multi-objective
partially observed infinite horizon Markov game, where it is assumed that the follower
selects its policy with complete knowledge of the policy selected by the leader. The
objective is to generate a set of non-dominated policies from which the leader can se-
lect a most preferred policy in order to control a dynamic system that is also affected
by the control decisions of the follower. The leader-follower assumption allows the
POMG to be converted into a specially structured partially observed Markov deci-
sion process (POMDP) for the follower. We present a value determination procedure
to evaluate the performance of a given leader policy. This performance evaluation
process provides a foundation to generate non-dominated leader’s policies by using
existing heuristic approaches such as the multi-objective genetic algorithm (MOGA).
Treating performance measures as fitness measures, the MOGA creates successive
generations of leader policies and eliminates all but the non-dominated set of leader
policies. The leader can then select the policy from this set that the leader considers
to be the most preferred. This approach to decision-making extends the existing lit-
erature on sequential games by explicitly considering the infinite horizon interaction
of two non-myopic agents, each of whom adjusts its decisions according to the other
agent’s decisions. Furthermore, this model considers the case where neither agent has
complete knowledge of the other agent’s current state.
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In Chapter III, we investigate the value of information for the leader for the sin-
gle objective version of the partially observed Markov game (POMG) developed in
Chapter II. We first summarize previously determined results in the literature for the
POMDP, based on two different definitions of observation quality and then compare
and contrast these two definitions. We determine how the leader’s criterion value
changes due to changes in the leader’s quality of observation of the follower and show
that the value of information results for the POMDP can be directly extended to
the POMG for sufficiently small changes of observation quality. We show that dis-
continuities in the leader’s value function, as a function of observation quality, can
occur when the change of observation quality is significant enough for the follower
to change its policy. We also present conditions that determine when a discontinu-
ity may occur and conditions that guarantee that a discontinuity will not degrade
leader performance. We show that when the leader and the follower are collaborative
and the follower completely observes the leader’s initial state, discontinuities in the
leader’s value function will not occur. However, we present examples that show that
improving observation quality does not necessarily improve the leader’s value func-
tion, whether or not the POMG is a collaborative game.
In Chapter IV, we apply the POMG analyzed in Chapters II and III in order to
develop a new dynamic risk analysis model that can explicitly describe the strategic
interaction between two intelligent and adaptive agents with different objectives over
an at most countable number of decision epochs. Both of the agents can select its
action on the basis of possibly inaccurate data collected at current and past decision
epochs. Our risk analysis tool is comprised of two components: a consequence assess-
ment tool and a game theoretic optimization model. Several different variations of the
model, where these variations are distinguished by the quality of observation that one
agent has of the other agent’s current state, are considered in order to analyze how the
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defender’s performance changes as the information accuracy changes. We present our
approach by an illustrative example involving a liquid egg production system where
an adversary may seek to contaminate the food production facility with a biological
or chemical toxin, and the defender (e.g. the plant manager) has to balance achieving
two objectives: (1) maximizing plant productivity, and (2) minimizing the expected
consequence of deliberate contamination. Our preliminary analysis shows that the
system is under greatest risk if the defender’s state can be accurately observed by
the attacker but the defender can only inaccurately observe the attacker’s state. We
show the impact on risk reduction of reducing the attacker’s observation accuracy
of the defender. We evaluate the defender’s performance, as a function of the de-
fender’s observation accuracy of the attacker, indicating the significant value-added
that observation accuracy can play in such situations. We show how system risk can
be dynamic as a result of the strategic interaction between two agents. We show
that a good defender’s policy can redirect the attacker’s interests to less vulnerable
targets and lengthen the expected time till an attack occurs. A sensitivity analysis is
performed to better understand what parameter values need careful assessment and
what parameters do not.
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CHAPTER II
A LEADER-FOLLOWER PARTIALLY OBSERVED,
MULTIOBJECTIVE MARKOV GAME
2.1 Introduction
The intent of this research is to generate a set of non-dominated policies from which
one of two agents (the leader) with multiple objectives can select a most preferred
policy to control a dynamic system that is also affected by the control decisions of the
other agent (the follower). Such information can serve as input to a decision support
system that, for example, is based on a deterministic version of multi-attribute utility
theory (Keeney and Raiffa, 1993; Holloway and White, 2008). In this context, the re-
sults presented in this chapter generate options (i.e., policies) for consideration by (1)
creating multiple generations of policies and eliminating all but the non-dominated
set of policies from the last generation and (2) determining value scores for each of
the policies in this non-dominated set.
The motivating application of this research is the operation of a liquid egg produc-
tion facility in order to maximize the supply chain’s productivity while minimizing
its vulnerability to the intentional insertion of a biological or chemical toxin into the
food production and distribution system (see Manning, et al., 2005; O’Ryan, et al.,
1996; Sobel, et al., 2002). Liquid eggs are ingredients in a wide variety of foods, and
contaminated liquid eggs could lead to significant morbidity and mortality. See Mo-
htadi and Murshid (2009) for background information about the importance of this
application area. For this application, we assume the leader manages the production
facility and is trying to balance two objectives: (1) maximize productivity and (2)
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minimize vulnerability.
Although initially developed to model the liquid egg production process, the approach
for decision aiding presented in this chapter can model a broad class of multi-epoch
game applications when all agents are intelligent and adaptive. More generally, our
objective is to provide decision support to the manager of a dynamic system when
there is a second intelligent and adaptable agent with its own objective. This second
agent can be cooperative, non-cooperative, or a mixture of both. Since most systems
that we have been considering are in the private sector, we have assumed that the
manager considers multiple objectives (e.g., maximize productivity, minimize risk)
in operating the system. We believe that a multi-objective extension of the POMG
represents a particularly appropriate model for this decision-making scenario.
Our approach to decision support is described as follows. We begin with an initial
(i.e., first generation) set of possible leader policies. We then use a multi-objective
genetic algorithm (MOGA) to create successive generations of presumably higher
quality leader policies. We then determine the non-dominated set of the final gener-
ation of leader policies and present this set to the leader. The leader can then select
the most preferred policy from this set for implementation.
The MOGA must know the fitness measures of each of the current leader policies
before it can create the next generation of leader policies. The fitness measures of a
leader policy are measures of how well the leader’s objectives are met by this policy
and depend on the follower’s policy. We assume the follower knows the policy selected
by the leader. This computationally advantageous assumption allows the POMG to
be converted into a specially structured partially observed Markov decision process
(POMDP) describing the follower’s problem. Solving this POMDP determines the
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follower policy. Given the leader policy and the follower policy, the fitness measures
for the leader policy can then be computed by a value determination step.
We remark that the assumption that the follower knows the policy of the leader is a
conservative assumption from the perspective of the leader and could unrealistically
bias the game to the advantage of the follower. However, this bias is mollified by
the fact that the leader and follower do not share the same data at each decision
epoch, and hence the follower can only infer what action the leader will actually take.
This assumption is also reasonable for many applications. For example, if the leader
is a large governmental agency or corporation and the follower is an individual or
group intent on attacking the leader, then it may be reasonable to assume that the
follower will know more about the leader than the leader will know about the follower.
Many of the methodological characteristics of the decision support model presented
in this chapter have been considered elsewhere in the decision, risk, and reliability
analysis literatures. Models of intelligent agents or adversaries are examined by Car-
doso and Diniz (2009). The single-period leader-follower (Stackelberg) game has been
widely used to analyze the strategic interactions between two intelligent and adaptive
agents. For example, Cavusoglu, et al., (2013) have studied the impacts of passenger
profiling on airport security operations. Bakir (2011) analyzed resource allocation
for cargo container transportation security. Other applications of the single-period
leader-follower game are presented in Bier, et al., (2007, 2008) and Zhuang and Bier
(2007). Multi-period games have been considered by Wang and Bier(2011), who
examined a two-period leader-follower repeated game, and by Hausken and Zhuang
(2011), who studied a multi-period game with myopic agents. Application of a com-
pletely observable stochastic game to overseas cargo container security can be found
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in Bakir and Kardes (2009). Rothschild, et al., (2012) studied the imperfect observa-
tions of the other agent’s action by a k-level game theory model.
Each of above methodological characteristics is intended to enhance the realism of the
respective model. Our model extends the existing literature on stochastic games by
explicitly considering the multi-period interaction of two non-myopic agents, a leader
and a follower, each of whom adjust its decisions according to the other agent’s
decisions over an infinite planning horizon for the case where neither agent has com-
plete information about the other agent. This model can be used for cooperative
games, non-cooperative games, or a mixture of both. Furthermore, we introduce
multi-objective optimization to the general-sum partially observed Markov game to
enable multi-attribute decision making. By combining these characteristics into a
single model, as has been done in this chapter, we believe that the modeling realism
of the resulting model has been further enhanced. However, and not surprisingly,
additional model realism has resulted in increased computational challenges. Dealing
with these challenges is the focus of much of this chapter.
We summarize the contributions of this chapter as follows. Based on the POMG,
POMDP, and MOGA models and computational results associated with the latter
two models, we have identified a set of assumptions and developed results that have
created a pathway to a tractable heuristic for the POMG. The set of assumptions
and results are:
• At the policy level (before the game begins), we assume the follower becomes
fully aware of the policy selected by the leader. This assumption allows the
POMG to be transformed into a more computationally familiar POMDP.
• We assume the leader’s policy is a finite-memory policy. This assumption guar-
antees that the resulting specially structured POMDP has a computationally
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useful epoch-invariant, finite dimensional sufficient statistic (Proposition 2.1).
• The resulting follower policy is a perfect memory policy, which we approximate
with a finite-memory policy. This finite-memory approximation guarantees that
the value determination step necessary to compute the fitness measures for the
given leader policy has an epoch-invariant, finite dimensional sufficient statistic
(Proposition 2.2).
• We then are able to compute the fitness measures for each current generation
leader policy. The MOGA uses these fitness measures to create the next gener-
ation of leader policies.
• The non-dominated set of the final generation of leader policies created by
the MOGA and the fitness measures of each non-dominated leader policy then
represents the output of our process.
The chapter is organized as follows. We review the pertinent literature associated
with the MOGA, POSG, and POMDP in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, we describe the
MOGA in more detail, show how the fitness measures are computed using the POMG
and the POMDP, and present equilibrium conditions. In Section 2.4 we illustrate how
our decision support procedure can be applied to a simplified liquid eggs supply chain
security problem and demonstrate computational feasibility. Section 2.5 summarizes
research results and discusses future research directions.
2.2 Literature Review
The research presented in this chapter contributes to the POSG literature by propos-
ing a framework for a general sum leader-follower partially observed Markov game
with multiple criteria for the leader and a corresponding heuristic solution procedure.
The proposed solution procedure uses solution techniques from the existing POMDP
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and MOGA literature. We now review the pertinent POMDP, MOGA and POSG
literature.
2.2.1 The partially observed Markov decision process
The POMDP is a model of single agent sequential decision making under uncertainty
that takes into consideration possibly inaccurate and/or costly observations of the
state of the system under control. Relative to the completely observed Markov de-
cision process (i.e., the MDP; see Puterman, 1994), the POMDP represents a more
general but significantly more computationally challenging model. In seminal re-
search, Smallwood and Sondik (1973) and Sondik (1978) showed that the optimal cost
function of the POMDP has a computationally interesting structure and presented
successive approximations approaches for solving the POMDP that exploited this
structure. Zhang (2010) revisited these structural results and convergence properties
by exploiting the dual relationship between hyperplanes and points in the POMDP
and related the solution of the POMDP as a Minkowski sum problem in computational
geometry. Monahan (1982), Eagle (1984), and White and Scherer (1989) presented
improved algorithms based on these structural results. Detailed descriptions of other
exact algorithms can be found in Cheng (1988), Littman (1994a), Cassandra, et al.,
(1994), Cassandra, et al., (1997), Feng and Zilberstein (2004), Lin, et al., (1998, 2004)
and Naser-Moghadasi (2012). Surveys of related solution techniques and complexity
analyses for the POMDP can be found in Monahan (1982), Lovejoy (1991a), White
(1991), Cassandra (1994) and Poupart (2005). The solution technique in Lin, et al.,
(1998, 2004) is used to solve the follower’s optimization problem in this chapter, for
any given leader’s policy.
In the development of approximate solution techniques for POMDPs, point-based
35
value iteration (PBVI) was presented and analysed in Pineau, et al., (2003) and
Shani, et al., (2013). Platzman (1977, 1980), White and Scherer (1994), Littman
(1994b), Hauskrecht (1997), Hansen (1998a, 1998b), Poupart and Boutilier (2004),
Poupart (2005) examined finite memory policies and finite-state controllers. The con-
cept of a finite memory policy is used in this chapter to approximate the follower’s
best response perfect memory policy in order to calculate the leader’s value function.
Other approximate methods for POMDPs are reviewed in Hauskrecht (2000), Ab-
erdeen (2003), and Yu (2007).
2.2.2 The partially observable stochastic game
The stochastic game introduced by Shapley (1953) represents a multi-agent planning
problem in a stochastic environment. In this setting, each player considers the con-
sequences of its own action and the actions that its opponents or teammates may
take. Algorithms for computing Nash equilibria for stochastic games can be found
in Raghavan and Filar (1991), Filar, et al., (1997), and Ummels (2010). Two el-
ements in our partially observed Markov game model, Stackelberg equilibrium and
multi-objective decision making, have been studied in completely observed stochastic
games. For example, Vorobeychik and Singh (2012), Vorobeychik, et al., (2012, 2014),
Letchford, et al., (2012) have introduced Stackelberg equilibria to stochastic games.
Canu and Mouaddib (2011) investigated how to coordinate a group of robots for
planet exploration by a vector-valued stochastic game with Stackelberg equilibrium.
This chapter further extends the Stackelberg equilibrium concept and multi-objective
optimization to a general-sum partially observed Markov game.
The POSG is a new, relatively unexamined generalization of the stochastic game,
where the states of the game are not precisely observed by the players and all players
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make decisions based on these partial observations. Although POSGs provide a robust
framework for multi-agent planning, Bernstein, et al., (2002) showed that POSGs are
computationally intractable when problem size grows. Rabinovich, et al., (2003) has
shown that even epsilon-optimal approximations are NP-hard. As a result, most of
the work in the literature has focused on POSGs with special structure. McEneaney
(2004) focused on a game where only one player has imperfect information. Ghosh,
et al., (2004), Oliehoek, et al., (2005), and Bopardikar and Hespanha (2011) studied a
zero-sum version of the POSG. Emery-Montemerlo, et al., (2004) approximated a co-
operative POSG by a series of Bayesian games. Another cooperative POSG, called a
decentralized partially observable Markov decision process (DEC-POMDP), has also
been extensively studied by Becker, et al., (2004), Bernstein, et al., (2005), Seuken
and Zilberstein (2007), and Oliehoek, et al., (2008). A survey of the DEC-POMDP
can be found in Oliehoek (2012). A cooperative POSG is applicable only when the
players are strictly cooperative. In contrast, this chapter focuses on a generalized
solution procedure that can be used to solve general-sum multi-objective partially
observed Markov games when the players are cooperative, noncooperative, or a mix-
ture of both.
For the general-sum partially observed Markov game, Hespanha and Prandini (2001)
proved the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a two-player finite-horizon problem.
Hansen, et al., (2004) developed a dynamic program for general POSGs by pruning
very weakly dominated strategies and then showed that this dynamic programming
approach can achieve optimality for cooperative settings. However, this approach is
computationally intractable for all but the smallest problems. Kumar and Zilber-
stein (2009) developed an approximate solution procedure for the POSG based on
Hansen’s work. While Hansen and Kumar’s work focuses on the Nash equilibrium,
this chapter is interested in Stackelberg equilibrium that can be used in security
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applications. Interactive POMDPs (I-POMDPs) addressed in Gmytrasiewicz and
Doshi (2005) demonstrated another framework for general multi-agent planning by
augmenting the state space to include models of other players’ behaviour. However,
these I-POMDPs are difficult to solve optimally because the states are infinitely nested
by construction (Doshi, 2012). The method we propose in this chapter considers the
case where the players make their decisions based on their past histories. Hence we
avoid the infinitely nested modeling, which may make I-POMDPs difficult to solve in
general (Doshi, 2012). In addition, connected with multi-objective optimization, our
framework can also be used for the agents with multiple criteria.
2.2.3 The multi-objective genetic algorithm
Genetic algorithms, introduced by Holland (1975), are adaptive heuristic search tech-
niques that mimic the process of natural evolution. A genetic algorithm represents
each feasible problem solution in a population of solutions as a genome or chromo-
some and begins with an initial population of feasible solutions. Solutions having
high measures of fitness are preferably selected during each generation to produce the
next generation of solutions, which typically have improved fitness measures due to
the application of genetic (e.g., mutation and crossover) operators. After a number of
generations, the population presumably evolves to optimal or near-optimal solutions.
Goldberg (1989), Forrest (1993) and Srinivas and Patnaik (1994) present surveys of
genetic algorithms and their related theories.
Multi-objective genetic algorithms (MOGA) are designed for the simultaneous opti-
mization of multiple, often competing objectives. Usually the optimal solutions are a
set of points, called the Pareto-optimal set, in the sense that no improvement can be
made in any objective without sacrificing the other objectives. The MOGA pushes the
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Pareto frontier towards the ideal optimal set of solutions as the algorithm proceeds.
MOGA algorithms include: the vector evaluated GA (VEGA) (Schaffer, 1985), the
Niched Pareto GA (NPGA) (Horn, et al., 1994), the Pareto Envelope-based Selection
Algorithms (PESA) (Corne, et al., 2000) and the Fast Non-dominated sorting GA
(NSGA-II) (Deb, et al., 2002). Surveys are presented in Coello (2000) and Konak,
et al.,(2006). MOGAs have been widely applied in optimization and decision making
problems (see Ponnambalam et al., 2001; Deb, 2001; Ombuki, et al., 2006; Lin and
Gen, 2008; Bowman, et al., 2010; Yildirim and Mouzon 2012). This chapter will use
a MOGA, the NSGA-II, to generate policies from which the leader will choose a most
preferred policy.
2.3 Model and Analysis
We present the POMG model in Section 2.3.1. In order to determine an optimal
response policy for the follower, the POMDP is constructed by combining the POMG
model with the leader’s policy that is currently under consideration. The resulting
POMDP is presented and examined in Section 2.3.2. For computational reasons for
the leader, we require that the leader and follower policies to be finite memory poli-
cies. However, the POMDP constructs a perfect memory follower policy. In Section
2.3.3, we present an approach for determining a finite-memory approximation of a
perfect memory policy. In order for the MOGA to determine the next generation
of leader policies, fitness measures must be calculated for each policy in the current
generation of leader policies. Each fitness measure is a measure of an objective of the
leader. In Section 2.3.4 we present an approach for determining the fitness measures,
for any given leader policy and follower policy. Section 2.3.5 describes how we used
a MOGA to generate a non-dominated set of leader policies. Section 2.3.6 addresses
equilibria.
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2.3.1 Partially Observed Markov Game
The partially observed Markov game (POMG) serves as the modeling basis of our
decision support system design. The POMG is comprised of:
Decision epochs: Let {0, 1, . . .} be the set of all decision epochs when both agents
select actions simultaneously. Thus, the problem horizon is countable and infinite.
State spaces: Let SL and SF be the state spaces of the leader and the follower, re-
spectively. Both spaces are epoch-invariant and finite. At decision epoch t, let sL(t)
be the leader’s state, sF (t) be the follower’s state, and denote s(t) = {sL(t), sF (t)}.
Action spaces: Let AL and AF be the epoch-invariant action spaces of the leader and
the follower, both of which are finite. At decision epoch t, let aL(t) be the leader’s
action, aF (t) be the follower’s action, and denote a(t) = {aL(t), aF (t)}.
Observation spaces: Let ZL and ZF be the observation spaces of the leader and the
follower, both of which are epoch-invariant and finite. At decision epoch t, let zF (t)
be the follower’s observation of the leader’s state, zL(t) the leader’s observation of
the follower’s state, and denote z(t) = {zL(t), zF (t)}.
Systems dynamics: We assume the epoch-invariant probability P (z(t + 1), s(t +
1)|s(t), a(t)) is given. Note that
P (z(t+ 1), s(t+ 1)|s(t), a(t)) = P (z(t+ 1)|s(t+ 1), s(t), a(t))P (s(t+ 1)|s(t), a(t)),
where P (z(t+ 1)|s(t+ 1), s(t), a(t)) is referred to as the state observation probability
and P (s(t+ 1)|s(t), a(t)) is referred to as the state transition probability.
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Single Period Cost and Criteria: Let cF (s(t), a(t)) be the decision epoch invariant
single period cost accrued by the follower at epoch t, given s(t) and a(t), and let
cLi (s(t), a(t)) be the decision epoch invariant single period cost accrued by the leader
with respect to criterion i at epoch t, given s(t) and a(t). The criteria under consid-
eration are the concomitant expected total discounted costs over the infinite horizon.
Policies: A policy πk for agent k ∈ {L = leader, F = follower} is a mapping from
what agent k knows at epoch t into its set of available actions, Ak. Policies can be
random and hence described by conditional probabilities. We restrict our interest to
stationary policies. Stationary policies tend to be easy to implement and in many
cases, e.g., the determination of optimal follower response policies for a broad class
of scalar criteria, sufficiently rich to contain an optimal policy.
Information patterns: We assume the leader chooses a finite-memory policy πL, a
policy which is a mapping from the set of all I L(t, τ) into AL at decision epoch
t, where for k ∈ {L, F}, I k(t, τ) = {zk(t), . . . , zk(t − τ + 1), sk(t), . . . , sk(t − τ +
1), ak(t − 1), . . . , ak(t − τ)}. Thus, πL is of the form {P (aL(t)|I L(t, τ))}. Hence,
when selecting an action, we assume the leader knows the current and τ most recent
observations of the other agent’s state, its current and τ most recent state values, and
the τ most recent actions it has selected. These are reasonable assumptions for many
applications. For example, in the context of the application mentioned in Section 2.4,
the defender may know its defensive resource allocation, but have little knowledge
about the attacker’s status. As another example, a company knows its own state,
but it may know little about its competitor’s state. Below we will assume the leader
knows information in addition to I L(t, τ) in order to determine its criteria values.
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Given πL, the POMG becomes a specially structured POMDP for the follower, which
the follower solves in order to determine an optimal perfect-memory response pol-
icy; that is, this response policy is a mapping into AF from the set of all I F (0) =
{sF (0), yF (0)} when t = 0 and from the set of all I F (t) = {zF (t), . . . , zF (1), sF (t), . . . , sF (0), aF (t−
1), . . . , aF (0), yF (0)} when t ≥ 1, where form, k ∈ {L, F}, m 6= k, yk(0) = {P (I m(0, τ))}.
Let yk(t) = {P (I m(t, τ)|I k(t))} when t ≥ 1, where yk(t) is a ”belief” array that
indicates what agent k can infer about the other agent’s information pattern, i.e.,
I m(t, τ),m 6= k. We will show later that {sF (t), yF (t)} is a sufficient statistic for
this POMDP, given this perfect-memory information pattern. We remark that the
arrays {yF (t)} are needed as part of the sufficient statistic in order for the follower to
infer the leader’s action selection in determining the follower’s criterion value. We fur-
ther remark that Bayes’ Rule can be used to compute yk(t+ 1), given yk(t), zk(t+ 1),
sk(t + 1), and ak(t): Let ςk(t) = {zk(t), sk(t), ak(t − 1)} and ς(t) = {ςL(t), ςF (t)}.
Without loss of generality, we determine yF (t+ 1), given yF (t) and ςF (t+ 1). Note,
I L(t+ 1, τ) = {ςL(t+ 1),I L(t, τ − 1)} and I F (t+ 1) = {ςF (t+ 1),I F (t)}. Then,
P (ςL(t+1),I L(t, τ−1)|ςF (t+1),I F (t)) =
∑
ς′
P (ςL(t+1),I L(t, τ)|ςF (t+1),I F (t)),
where ς ′ = ςL(t− τ + 1).
Note
P (ς(t+1),I L(t, τ)|I F (t)) = P (ςL(t+1),I L(t, τ)|ςF (t+1),I F (t))P (ςF (t+1)|I F (t))
and that





P (ς(t+ 1),I L(t, τ)|I F (t)),
where ς ′′ = ςL(t+ 1),I = I L(t, τ).
Now,
P (ς(t+ 1),I L(t, τ)|I F (t)) = P (ς(t+ 1)|I L(t, τ),I F (t))P (I L(t, τ)|I F (t)).
42
Then,
P (ς(t+1)|I L(t, τ),I F (t)) = P (z(t+1), s(t+1)|a(t),I L(t, τ),I F (t))P (a(t)|I L(t, τ),I F (t)).
Thus, we note that P (ςL(t+1),I L(t, τ−1)|ςF (t+1),I F (t)) is a function of {P (I L(t, τ)|I F (t))}.
The reason for requiring the leader’s policy to be finite-memory now becomes clear:
to guarantee that there is a sufficient statistic for this POMDP that has a computa-
tionally desirable finite and t-invariant number of elements, whereas the cardinality
of I F (t) increases as t increases. A similar POMDP construction can be found in
Kandori and Obara (2010) for a repeated game, whereas we construct POMDP to
solve a partially observed stochastic game.
The criterion value for each of the leader’s objectives (i.e. fitness measures) is well de-
fined, given leader and follower policies. However, as is true for the follower’s POMDP,
we wish to determine a sufficient statistic that has a finite and t-invariant number of
elements when determining criteria values. We therefore assume that the follower’s
policy πF is a finite-memory policy. An approximation procedure for determining
a finite-memory policy πF (i.e., a policy of the form {P (aF (t)|I F (t, τ))}) from the
optimal perfect-memory policy determined from the follower’s POMDP (which is of
the form {P (aF (t)|I F (t))}) is given later in the chapter.
We assume that the data available to the leader for value determination are I L(0) =
{I L(0, τ), yL(0)} when t = 0 and are I L(t) = {zL(t), . . . , zL(1), sL(t), . . . , sL(1), aL(t−
1), . . . , aL(0),I L(0, τ), yL(0)} when t ≥ 1. We will show later that {I L(t, τ), yL(t)}
is a sufficient statistic for this value determination step, given this perfect-memory
information pattern. We note that this sufficient statistic also has a finite and t-
invariant number of elements.
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In summary, we assume:
• The leader knows I L(t, τ) at decision epoch t for selecting its action aL(t).
• Given the leader’s policy, the follower determines its optimal perfect-memory
response policy, assuming it knows I F (t) at decision epoch t for selecting its
action aF (t) and for inferring the selection of the leader’s action aL(t).
• Given the follower’s perfect-memory best response policy, the leader approxi-
mates the follower’s response policy with a finite-memory policy that depends
on I F (t, τ) at decision epoch t for selecting the follower’s action aF (t).
• The leader then takes its policy and the finite-memory approximation to the
follower’s policy in order to determine the leader’s criteria values, assuming the
leader knows I L(t) at decision epoch t for selecting its action aL(t) and for
inferring the selection of the follower’s action aF (t).
We note that the sufficient conditions for perfect-memory information patterns I F (t)
and I L(t) are asymmetric, which is a result of the facts that:
• In determining vF (I F (t)) and an optimal perfect-memory policy for the fol-
lower, we only need to provide a priori data to support being able to infer the
data needs of the leader’s finite memory policy.
• In determining the criteria values for the leader, value determination requires
consideration of both the leader’s policy and the follower’s policy, which requires
a priori data to support the leader’s policy and a priori data to be able to infer
the data needs of the finite-memory approximation to the follower’s optimal
policy.
We remark that the POMDP presented in (Smallwood and Sondik, 1973) and else-
where typically assumes the decision maker’s state is partially observed, whereas we
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are assuming each agent completely observes its state and partially observes the state
of the other agent. In the context of the POMDP, the information patterns that are
assumed in this chapter are analogous to the special case where the underlying state
of the POMDP is a two-vector, one element of which is completely observed and the
other element is partially observed.
Objectives: The follower’s objective is to select a stationary policy that optimizes its
criterion (or in reality we settle for an ε-optimal policy if an optimal policy is diffi-
cult or impossible to obtain). The leader’s objective is to optimize all criteria under
consideration in some balanced manner, with this balance being determined by the
leader. Our objective is to provide the leader with a non-dominated set of policies
from which to choose a single policy for implementation.
2.3.2 Determination of a Best Response Policy π̄F , Given a leader policy
πL
Given the leader’s policy πL, let vF (I F (t)) be the follower’s optimal criterion value,
given I F (t). Then, according to results in (Puterman, 1994; Chapter 6), vF uniquely
satisfies
vF = HFvF (2.1)
where for any v,
[HFv](I F (t)) = min
aF (t)
hF (I F (t), aF (t), v),
hF (I F (t), aF (t), v) = E{cF (s(t), a(t)) + βv(I F (t+ 1))|I F (t), aF (t)},
and where E is the expectation operator. Further, a policy that attains the above
minimum for all I F (t) is an optimal perfect memory policy. We now state our first
result.
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Proposition 2.1. Assume πL is given. Then for each I F (t) there is an at most
countable set of arrays Γ∗(sF (t)) that only depends on sF (t), such that:
vF (I F (t)) = min{
∑
γ(I L(t, τ))P (I L(t, τ)|I F (t)) : γ ∈ Γ∗(sF (t))},
where the sum is over all I L(t, τ).
Proof. Assume v and Γ are such that
v(I F (t)) = min{
∑
γ(I L(t, τ))P (I L(t, τ)|I F (t)) : γ ∈ Γ(sF (t))},
where the sum is over all IL(t, τ). Then the analysis, following the same line of
arguments in (Smallwood and Sondik, 1973), shows that
hF (I F (t), aF (t), v) = min{
∑
γ′(I L(t, τ))P (I L(t, τ)|I F (t)) : γ′ ∈ Γ′(sF (t), aF (t))},
where the sum is over all I L(t, τ). If γ′ ∈ Γ′(sF (t), aF (t)) then γ′ is of the form
γ(I L(t, τ)) =
∑
aL(t)






γi,j(zL(t+ 1), sL(t+ 1), aL(t),I L(t, τ − 1))P (z(t+ 1), s(t+ 1)|s(t), a(t))],
where γi,j can be any element in Γ(sF (t+1)) for each sF (t+1) = i and zF (t+1) = j.
And {zL(t+ 1), sL(t+ 1), aL(t),I L(t, τ − 1)} = I L(t+ 1, τ). Then,
[HFv](I F (t)) = min{
∑
I L(t,τ)
γ′′(I L(t, τ))P (I L(t, τ)|IF (t)) : γ′′ ∈ Γ′′(sF (t))},
where Γ′′(sF (t)) = ∪aF (t)Γ′(sF (t), aF (t)).
The operator HF is a contraction operator on the Banach space comprised of all
functions mapping I F (t) into the real line, having as its norm the supremum norm,
and as a result, the sequence {vn}, where vn+1 = HFvn, converges to vF for any given
v0. The above result indicates that HF preserves piecewise linearity and concavity
and in the limit preserves concavity.
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With regard to the implications of Proposition 2.1 and results in (Puterman, 1994;
Chapter 6), vF and hence an optimal policy can depend on I F (t) only through
(sF (t), yF (t)). Hence, (sF (t), yF (t)) is a sufficient statistic. Further, vF is concave in
yF (t). Additionally, if Γ∗(sF (t)) is a finite set of arrays for all sF (t), then vF is piece-
wise linear. Note that the dimension of (sF (t), yF (t)) is finite and t-invariant. Note
further that the finite dimensionality of yF (t) follows directly from the finite-memory
assumption imposed on πL. Thus, assuming Γ∗(sF (t)) is a finite set of arrays and
vF is described in terms of (sF (t), yF (t)), vF has a finite representation. We remark
that the cardinality of Γ′′(sF (t)) can be substantially larger than the cardinality of
Γ(sF (t)), where both Γ(sF (t)) and Γ′′(sF (t)) are defined in the proof of Proposition
2.1. Techniques for reducing the cardinality of Γ′′(sF (t)) can be found in White (1991)
and Lin, et al., (1998, 2004).
2.3.3 A Finite-Memory Approximation to π̄F
As noted above, an optimal policy π̄F for the follower that achieves the minimum
in Equation (2.1) depends on I F (t) and hence π̄F is a perfect-memory policy π̄F :
{I F (t)} → AF . In order to ensure that the leader’s criteria have finite represen-
tation, the follower policy must also be a finite-memory policy from the leader’s
perspective. There are a variety of ways to approximate a perfect-memory policy by
a finite-memory policy. We determine a finite-memory (approximate) policy from a
given perfect memory policy as follows. We note since (sF (t), yF (t)) is a sufficient
statistic, the perfect-memory policy π̄F is a mapping π̄F : {sF (t), yF (t)} → AF . We
also observe that {(I F (t, τ), yF (t − τ)), t = 1, 2, . . .} is also a sufficient statistic for
this problem, with yF (t−τ) representing the influence of data determined up through
epoch t− τ , by noting yF (t) can be determined from repeated application of Bayes’
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rule, given I F (t, τ), yF (t− τ), and πL. By (arbitrarily) assuming a uniform distribu-
tion over yF (t−τ), we can determine a finite-memory approximate policy in the form
of {P (aF (t)|I F (t, τ))}. The quality of a finite memory policy has been investigated
in White and Scherer(1994). Although we have not done extensive numerical test-
ing, we have observed that finite memory approximations of optimal perfect memory
policies can be quite good, even for small τ . Below is an example from our numerical
experiment with 2 stats, 2 observations and 2 actions for each agent. The resulting
γ vectors for sF = 1 are:
(sL, zL) (s1, z1) (s1, z2) (s2, z1) (s2, z2)
aF = a1 [4.4784 4.1677 4.4784 4.1677]
aF = a2 [4.7137 2.5929 4.7137 2.5929]
At the related information pattern (sF = 1, zF = 1), the follower will select action
a2 for y
F (t) = P (sL(t), zL(t)|I F (t)) where P (s1, z1|I F (t))+P (s2, z1|I F (t)) ≥ 0.85.
Let τ = 1. Drawing 500 samples of yF (t − 1) from a uniform distribution over
SL × ZL indicates that the resulting approximate finite memory policy is P (aF (t) =
a2|I F (t, τ = 1)) = 0.938. .
In the following context, we use πF to denote the finite-memory response policy ap-
proximation to the optimal perfect-memory policy for the follower. Other approaches
for determining a finite-memory approximation are under consideration and are topics
for future research.
2.3.4 Fitness Measure Determination
Let vLi (π
L, πF ; I L(t)) be the criterion value for the leader’s ith criterion, given I L(t),
a leader policy πL = {P (aL(t)|I L(t, τ))}, and a follower policy πF = {P (aF (t)|I F (t, τ))}.
For notational simplicity, we assume that the dependence of vLi (π
L, πF ; I L(t)) on
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(πL, πF ) is implicit; hence, vLi (I
L(t)) = vLi (π
L, πF ; I L(t)). Then according to re-
sults in (Puterman, 1994; Chapter 6), vLi uniquely satisfies
vLi (I
L(t)) = hLi (I
L(t), vLi )
for all I L(t), where
hLi (I
L(t), v) = E{cLi (s(t), a(t)) + βv(I L(t+ 1))|I L(t)}.
We now show that vLi (I
L(t)) is dependent on I L(t) only though (I L(t, τ), yL(t)).
Thus, (I L(t, τ), yL(t)) is a sufficient statistic.
Proposition 2.2. Assume (πL, πF ) are given finite-memory policies. Then, there is





L(t, τ),I F (t, τ))P (I F (t, τ)|I L(t)),
where the sum is over all I F (t, τ). Further, g∗i is the unique solution of the equation
g∗i (I
L(t, τ),I F (t, τ)) =
∑1




L(t+ 1),I L(t, τ − 1)), (zF (t+ 1),I F (t, τ − 1))]P (z(t+ 1), s(t+ 1)|s(t), a(t))},
where zk(t) = {zk(t), sk(t), ak(t − 1)},
∑1 is over all s(t) and a(t), and ∑2 is over
all z(t+ 1) and s(t+ 1).
Proof. We remark that since (πL, πF ) is assumed given, P (s(t), a(t)|I F (t, τ),I L(t, τ))
is well defined. Assume there is a function g such that
v(I L(t)) =
∑
g(I L(t, τ),I F (t, τ))P (I F (t, τ)|I L(t)),
where the sum is over all I F (t, τ). Then it is straightforward to show that there is




g′(I L(t, τ),I F (t, τ))P (I F (t, τ)|I L(t)),
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where the sum is over all I F (t, τ), and
g′(I L(t, τ),I F (t, τ)) =
∑1
P (s(t), a(t)|I F (t, τ),I L(t, τ)){cLi (s(t), a(t))
+ β
∑2
g[(zL(t+ 1),I L(t, τ − 1)), (zF (t+ 1),I F (t, τ − 1))]P (z(t+ 1), s(t+ 1)|s(t), a(t))},
and where zk(t) = {zk(t), sk(t), ak(t−1)},
∑1 is over all s(t) and a(t), and ∑2 is over
all z(t+ 1) and s(t+ 1).The result follows directly from the following facts:
• The operator HL, where [HLv](I L(t)) = hLi (I L(t), v), is a contraction operator
on the Banach space comprised of all functions mapping the set of all I L(t) into
the real line, having as its norm the supremum norm.
• As a result, the sequence {vn}, where vn+1 = HLvn, converges to vL for any given
v0.
Determine yk(t+1), given yk(t), zk(t+1), sk(t+1) and ak(t): Let ςk(t) = {zk(t), sk(t), ak(t−
1)} and ς(t) = {ςL(t), ςF (t)}. Without loss of generality, we determine yF (t+1), given
yF (t) and ςF (t+ 1). Note,
I L(t+ 1, τ) = {ςL(t+ 1),I L(t, τ − 1)} and I F (t+ 1) = {ςF (t+ 1),I F (t)}. Then,
P (ςL(t+1),I L(t, τ−1)|ςF (t+1),I F (t)) =
∑
ς′
P (ςL(t+1),I L(t, τ)|ςF (t+1),I F (t)),
where ς ′ = ςL(t− τ + 1).
Note
P (ς(t+1),I L(t, τ)|I F (t)) = P (ςL(t+1),I L(t, τ)|ςF (t+1),I F (t))P (ςF (t+1)|I F (t))
and that





P (ς(t+ 1),I L(t, τ)|I F (t)),
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where ς ′′ = ςL(t+ 1),I = I L(t, τ).
Now,
P (ς(t+ 1),I L(t, τ)|I F (t)) = P (ς(t+ 1)|I L(t, τ),I F (t))P (I L(t, τ)|I F (t)).
Then,
P (ς(t+1)|I L(t, τ),I F (t)) = P (z(t+1), s(t+1)|a(t),I L(t, τ),I F (t))P (a(t)|I L(t, τ),I F (t)).
Thus, we note that P (ςL(t+1),I L(t, τ−1)|ςF (t+1),I F (t)) is a function of {P (I L(t, τ)|I F (t))},
which is the result.
Since both πL and πF are finite-memory policies, then both I L(t, τ) and yL(t) are
t-invariant arrays of finite dimension, which enhances the potential computability of
vL. We remark that Proposition 2.2 holds for any given finite memory leader policy
ρL and follower policy ρF , where ρF is not necessarily a response policy to ρL.
We now summarize how fitness measures are determined for a given finite-memory
leader policy:
• Step 1: For a given leader policy, determine a perfect memory follower response
policy that achieves the minimum expected cost for the follower, using Proposition
2.1.
• Step 2: Approximate the resulting perfect-memory follower response policy by a
finite-memory policy.
• Step 3: Given the leader policy and the follower’s approximate response policy,
determine the concomitant fitness measures using Proposition 2.2.
2.3.5 Multi-Objective Genetic Algorithm
We now describe how we use a MOGA, the NSGA-II (Deb, 2002), to generate policies
from which the leader will choose a most preferred policy. We have found NSGA-II
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has worked well for the example presented in Section 2.4. Our framework, however,
is not restricted to any specific multi-objective genetic algorithm.
Let {πL(m),m = 1, . . . ,M} be the current population of the leader’s finite memory
policies, and for each m, let πF (m) be the approximate finite memory follower’s best
response policy to the leader’s policy πL(m), where M is the population size. Further,
let vLi (π
L(m), πF (m)) be the expected cost of the leader’s ith criterion, given the policy
pair (πL(m), πF (m)).
Definition 2.1. Policy πL is said to dominate policy ρL if
vLi (π
L, πF ) ≤ vLi (ρL, ρF ),∀i
and there exists at least one i such that
vLi (π
L, πF ) < vLi (ρ
L, ρF ),
where πF and ρF are the follower’s response policies to the leader’s policy πL and ρL,
respectively.
Policy πL is said to be non-dominated if there does not exist a policy that dominates
policy πL.
The MOGA constructs the next generation of policies from the current set of policies
as follows. The MOGA encodes each policy πL(m) into a chromosome. In the context
of our model, a natural encoding scheme is to represent the chromosome as an array
of probability mass vectors. Each row corresponds to a possible finite memory history
I L(t, τ), and it is a probability mass vector over the action space for I L(t, τ) that
denotes the probability that action aL is selected by the leader given finite memory
history I L(t, τ). The chromosome can be viewed as a long vector by concatenating
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the probability mass vector for each possible finite memory history. Since the seg-
ment of chromosome corresponding to a given finite memory history is a probability
distribution, it may create issues with offspring feasibility that can be solved by the
random keys method (Bean, 1994).
Random keys is a robust yet simple technique that can ensure the feasibility of off-
spring without disrupting the searching process, and it has been successfully used in
both discrete solution spaces (Bean, 1994) and continuous solution spaces (Lin, et al.,
1998 and 2004). Random keys encodes each possible solution as a vector of random
numbers of length K, where K is the cardinality of {∪I L(t,τ)ALI L(t,τ)}. A mapping is
used to decode the solution in order to calculate the fitness measure for this solution.
The mapping we used normalized each segment of chromosome corresponding to a
given finite memory history I L(t, τ). This encoding scheme follows the same idea as
Lin, et al., (1998, 2004). As indicated in Bean (1994) and Lin, et al., (1998), the key
difference between the random keys approach and simple normalization is that the
unnormalized random keys are maintained and used to search for a better solution,
and it will be only normalized in order to obtain its fitness measure. The MOGA
determines vLi , 1 ≤ i ≤ N for each chromosome, where N is the number of the leader’s
objectives. The tuple (vL1 , . . . , v
L
N) serves as the fitness measure of this chromosome.
On the basis of (vL1 , . . . , v
L
N), the population of chromosomes is partitioned into sub-
sets called fronts, where front 1 is the set of non-dominated chromosomes, and front
k + 1 is the set of non-dominated chromosomes when the chromosomes in fronts 1
through k are removed from consideration, k = 1, 2, . . .. Chromosomes in front k are
given rank k. In addition, the crowding distance of each chromosome is determined
within each front. The crowding distance is defined as the average Euclidean distance




measure of position. Crowding distance is considered a measure of diversity for the
policies, and for this measure, larger is considered better. The current generation of
policies is sorted according to ranking and crowding distance.
Parents are selected from the current generation of policies, based on their ranks and
crowding distances. Chromosomes with higher rank and larger crowding distance are
selected to generate offspring with higher probability. The selected parents form a
mating pool and generate offspring using a crossover operator. Typical crossover op-
erators may include one-point crossover, two-point crossover, and uniform crossover.
The specific selection may depend on the needs of applications, and we use one-
point crossover in our numerical example for illustration purposes. For each parents
pair, the crossover operator randomly exchanges a portion of the chromosomes with
each other to form two new offspring. A mutation operator is also used to maintain
genetic diversity from one generation to another. This operator randomly alters a
certain percentage of genes in the current generation of policies. The random keys
method places no restriction on the crossover operator and the mutation operator.
Then the non-dominated sorting procedure is applied again on the current popula-
tion and offspring population, the top M chromosomes are kept, producing the next
population. The number of iterations of the algorithm is a design parameter.
2.3.6 Equilibria
We remark that there are two equilibrium conditions, one associated with each agent.
With respect to the follower, assume π̄F is the perfect memory response policy to a
given leader policy πL. Then, results in Proposition 2.1 imply that
vF (I F (t)) = vF (πL, π̄F ; I F (t)) ≤ vF (πL, ρF ; I F (t))
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for all follower policies ρF and all I F (t), where a direct application of the re-
sults of Proposition 2.2 can be used to determine vF (ρL, ρF ; I F (t)) for any pair
of finite-memory leader-follower policies (ρL, ρF ). (In reality if an optimal policy
is difficult or impossible to obtain, for any given ε > 0, Proposition 2.1 implies
vF (πL, π̄F ; I F (t))− ε ≤ vF (πL, ρF ; I F (t)) for all follower policies ρF . )
With respect to the leader, let πF be a finite-memory approximation of the perfect
memory follower’s response policy π̄F to the given leader policy πL. Let vL(πL, πF ; I L(t))
be the vector of criterion values for the leader’s multiple objectives, given (πL, πF )
and information state I L(t). Our process of determining candidate leader policies
from which the leader can select the most preferred policy is intended to determine
(πL, πF ) pairs so that there exists no pair (ρL, ρF ) such that
vLi (ρ
L, ρF ; I L(t)) ≤ vLi (πL, πF ; I L(t)),∀i
for all I L(t), where ρL represents any leader policy and ρF represents a finite-memory
approximation of the perfect memory follower response policy to ρL.
We note that by Proposition 2.1 and results in (Puterman, 1994, Chapter 6), the
follower policy in the first equilibrium condition is an optimal perfect memory policy
(or ε-optimal policy); hence, it is not possible for the follower to achieve less (or less
than ε > 0) in expected total discounted cost by deviating from this policy. With
respect to the second equilibrium condition, we note that all of the follower’s policies
used here are finite memory approximations of the follower’s optimal perfect memory
response policy to the leader’s policy. Further, the process of determining the leader
policies does not guarantee that pairs (πL, πF ) will be determined that satisfy the
second equilibrium condition. Thus, there is no guarantee that the leader will not
want to deviate from the set of resultant non-dominated leader policies. However,
given a sufficient number of generations of the MOGA and a sufficiently large τ such
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that the finite memory follower policy is a good approximation to an optimal perfect
memory follower policy, it is reasonable to expect that good performance for the
leader can be achieved by implementing the resultant set of non-dominated leader
policies generated. Figure 2.1 provides an outline of the process for generating these
non-dominated leader policies.
Figure 2.1: Outline of the decision support process
2.4 An Illustrative Example
We now present an example to illustrate the potential applicability and numerical
feasibility of the methodology. A more in-depth application and numerical study will
be presented in the future.
Liquid eggs are widely used by food service providers, such as bakers or restaurant
chains, and are ingredients in many food products. We now show how the results
in Section 2.3 can be used to support a production manager in selecting a sequence
of actions to maximize the productivity of the liquid egg production facility while
minimizing the expected number of packages that exit the facility containing a lethal
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dose of a toxin due to intentional contamination. Thus, the expected number of con-
taminated packages represents the measure of risk under consideration.
Stackelberg games have been widely used in security applications. A software schedul-
ing assistant called the Intelligent Randomization in Scheduling (IRIS) system was
implemented in Tsai, et al., (2009) for the Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) in a single
period Stackelberg game framework in order to support law enforcement aboard U.S.
commercial flights. Pita, et al., (2009) developed ARMOR (Assistant for Random-
ized Monitoring Over Routes) using a Bayesian Stackelberg game to address the case
where the defender does not know the type of adversary, and it has been successfully
used at the Los Angeles International Airport to determine the checkpoints on the
roadways that enter the airport and canine patrol routes within the airport terminals
since 2007. However, such a single period static game cannot fully describe the dy-
namics of the physical environment and the adaptive nature of terrorist behavior over
time, since information for each agent is updated as time proceeds and each agent
will adjust its actions based upon its updated information.
The stochastic game is a powerful dynamic model for security applications, and it
is especially useful when the attacker moves through successive states to “probe” a
system before initiating an attack. Delle Fave, et al., (2014) developed a general
Bayesian Stackelberg game model to describe the dynamic execution uncertainty for
a security resource allocation problem, which can also be viewed as a special case
of a stochastic Stackelberg game. Vorobeychik, et al., (2012) modelled the adversar-
ial patrolling game as a stochastic game and computed Stackelberg equilibria. Such
stochastic games assume that the agents have complete knowledge of the other agent’s
state, which is not always true. For example, in the food supply chain security do-
main, it is often the case that the defender may only observe that some restricted
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toxins are missing. However, the defender may have little idea about where the toxins
have gone, who is the attacker, and how the attacker may make use of the toxins. In
addition, the private sector may have additional objectives (for example, maximize
productivity) besides mitigating adversarial risk. Hence, we will use the framework
proposed in Section 2.3 to address these issues.
We assume that both the manager and the adversary receive updated, possibly inac-
curate, data about the other agent just prior to each decision epoch. The adversary’s
criterion is to maximize the expected number of packages that exit the facility con-
taining a lethal dose of the toxin. Financial, morbidity, and mortality consequences
would clearly be dependent on the number of contaminated liquid egg packages that
exit the system, although determining these dependencies is outside of the scope of
our research.
We assume that there are two targets in the production facility, T1 and T2. These
two targets represent two different types of mixing tanks.
State space SF and action space AF of the adversary: State O is a state that the
adversary occupies while assembling an attack team, manufacturing the toxin, and
preparing the toxin for transport to a pre-attack state. The adversary can decide
to make transition to state PT1 and PT2, which are the pre-attack states in which
the adversary is armed and ready to attack target 1 and target 2, respectively. If in
PTi, the adversary can decide to make transition back to state O or attack target
i, i = 1, 2. The adversary must transit through state O in order to transition from
one pre-attack state to another.
State space SL and action space AL of the manager: The manager’s states include
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a full production high vulnerability state (FP ), a low production low vulnerability
state (LP ), and the attacked state (Att). In state FP , the facility runs with a high
level of productivity and the number of testing interruptions is small, and hence the
cost of testing is small. In state LP , the manager interrupts the production process
frequently (and expensively) to test for toxin, and as a result the productivity of the
facility is low, relative to the productivity of FP . If the facility is attacked while in
state LP , the probability of the attack being unsuccessful is high and the number of
contaminated packages that exits the facility is small. The manager can decide at
each decision epoch to keep the facility in its current state or try to switch to the other
state, which then occurs with given probability. We assume that the manager can
detect an attack if an attack has occurred. In this case, the manager will terminate
the game; i.e., the model automatically makes transition to the attacked state (Att),
which is an absorbing state (denoted by a dashed circle in Figure 2.2). The state of
the system is the cross product of the adversary’s state and the manager’s state and
is shown in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Transition diagram for the POMG numerical example
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Observation spaces: There are two possible realizations of zF , the adversary’s obser-
vation of the manager: the system is well guarded; the system is not guarded. The
three possible realizations of zL, the manager’s observation of the adversary, are: tar-
get 1 is under threat; target 2 is under threat; no threat. The observation matrices
for the adversary and the manager are listed in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2, respectively.
Dynamics: We assume that the dynamic structure P (s(t + 1), z(t + 1)|s(t), a(t))
is given and the dynamics of the system depend on the actions of both agents.
Note that P (s(t + 1), z(t + 1)|s(t), a(t)) = P (zL(t + 1)|sF (t + 1))P (zF (t + 1)|sL(t +
1))P (sF (t+ 1)|sF (t), aF (t))P (sL(t+ 1)|sL(t), aL(t)). Transition structures for the ad-
versary (P (sF (t+ 1)|sF (t), aF (t))) and the manager (P (sL(t+ 1)|sL(t), aL(t))) can be
found in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4, respectively.
Table 2.1: Adversary’s observation about manager’s state P (zF (t)|sL(t))
Defender’s state well guarded not guarded attacked
FP 0.3 0.7 0.0
LP 0.8 0.2 0.0
Att 0.0 0.0 1.0
Table 2.2: Manager’s observation about adversary’s state P (zL(t)|sF (t))
Attacker’s target 1 target 2 no threat target 1 target 2
state under threat under threat attacked attacked
PT1 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0
PT2 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.0
O 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0
T1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0
T2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
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Table 2.3: Transition structure for the adversary P (sF (t+ 1)|sF (t), aF (t))
sF = PT1 PT1 PT2 O T1 T2
aF=”attack” 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0
aF=”go to state O” 0.2 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0
sF = PT2 PT1 PT2 O T1 T2
aF=”attack” 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
aF=”go to state O” 0.0 0.2 0.8 0.0 0.0
sF = O PT1 PT2 O T1 T2
aF=”go to State PT1” 0.8 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0
aF=”go to State PT2” 0.0 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.0
Table 2.4: Transition structure for the manager P (sL(t+ 1)|sL(t), aL(t))
sL = FP FP LP Att
aL=”stay” 1.0 0.0 0.0
aL=”go to LP” 0.5 0.5 0.0
aL=”terminate and clean” 0.0 0.0 1.0
sL = LP FP LP Att
aL=”stay” 0.0 1.0 0.0
aL=”go to FP” 1.0 0.0 0.0
aL=”terminate and clean” 0.0 0.0 1.0
Reward structure: The reward structure for the manager has two components: the
single period productivity measure rL1 and the risk measure r
L
2 , which is the number
of units of contaminated liquid eggs products generated by the system if an attack
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has occurred and it is zero otherwise. The reward for the adversary is rF (s(t), a(t)) =
−ρrL2 (s(t), a(t)), where ρ is a coefficient to indicate that the value of an attack for
the adversary may be different from the value for the manager. The reward struc-
ture rk(s(t), a(t)), k ∈ {L, F} is due to Zhang (2013) who simulated the liquid eggs
production process by a state-space model. No reward is generated once the system
is in the trapping state and the game is terminated.
Information pattern and policy for the manager: The information pattern for the
manager is I L(t, τ) = {zL(t), sL(t)}. Thus, πL is of the form {P (aL(t)|zL(t), sL(t))}.
The construction of the POMDP for the adversary, given a manager’s policy πL: The
information pattern for the adversary is I F (t) = {zF (t), . . . , zF (1), sF (t), . . . , sF (0), aF (t−
1), . . . , aF (0), yF (0)} when t ≥ 1, where yF (0) = {P (zL(0), sL(0))}. vF uniquely sat-
isfies
vF (I F (t)) = max
aF (t)
E{rF (s(t), a(t)) + βvF (I F (t+ 1))|I F (t), aF (t)} (2.2)
According to Proposition 2.1, there is an at most countable set of arrays Γ∗(sF (t))
that only depends on sF (t), such that:
vF (sF (t), yF (t)) = max{
∑
zL(t),sL(t)
γ(zL(t), sL(t))P ({zL(t), sL(t)}|I F (t)) : γ ∈ Γ∗(sF (t))}
where yF (t) = P ({zL(t), sL(t)}|I F (t)). The POMDP solver was implemented using
the technique developed in Lin et al. (1998, 2004).
Finite-memory approximation: The resulting adversary’s policy is in the form of
πF : {sF (t), yF (t)} → AF . We approximate the perfect memory policy with a finite-
memory policy when τ = 1. yF (t) can be obtained by {zF (t), sF (t), aF (t−1), yF (t−1)}
using Bayes’ rule. We drew 500 samples of yF (t−1) from a uniform distribution over
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ZL × SL. For each sample, we obtained the perfect memory policy. The finite-
memory policy is approximated by the sample average of these perfect memory po-
lices. The resulting policy is of the form P (aF (t)|I F (t, τ = 1)) where I F (t, τ = 1) =
{zF (t), sF (t), aF (t− 1)}.
Fitness measure determination: Given that the manager’s policy is of the form
{P (aL(t)|zL(t), sL(t))} and the adversary’s policy is of the form {P (aF (t)|I F (t, τ =
1))}, the manager’s value function can be evaluated by Proposition 2.2 where g∗i , i ∈
{1 = productivity measure, 2 = risk measure} satisfies:








g∗i [{zL(t+ 1), sL(t+ 1)},I F (t+ 1, τ = 1)]P (z(t+ 1), s(t+ 1)|s(t), a(t))},
We determine g∗i by solving a system of linear equations. Hence, the fitness measures
can by computed by vLi (I
L(0)) =
∑
I F (0,τ) g
∗
i ({zL(0), sL(0)},I F (0, τ))P (I F (0, τ)|I L(0))
where P (I F (0, τ)|I L(0)) is given.
MOGA: The chromosome in MOGA encodes a manager’s policy by an array of proba-
bility mass vectors. Each row is a probability mass vector over the possible manager’s
actions for a possible value of {zL, sL}. We restrict our attention to deterministic man-
ager policies since they are easy to implement for end-users and easy to explain. The
advantages of a deterministic policy are also discussed in Paruchuri, et al., (2004)
and Basilico, et al., (2009). Hence, there are only 64 manager policies in total un-
der consideration. The MOGA used has a population size of 6, one point crossover
probability 1/3, and mutation rate 5%. The MOGA can probabilistically identify
the Pareto efficient policies within 5 generations. Parallel programming can be used
to evaluate the fitness measures in parallel for a population of leader’s policies. The
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runtime results on a computer with 3.10GHz CPU are summarized in Table 2.5.
Table 2.5: Runtime results
Task Average Time (s)
Solving a POMDP 0.3266
Finite memory policy approximation 0.0951
Fitness measure determination 0.0173
Total time for MOGA to converge 6.4731
The non-dominated set of policies (π1, ..., π5) and two baseline policies (b1, b2) are
listed in Table 2.6, and their corresponding performance measures (after normaliza-
tion) are summarized in Table 2.7. We note that both baseline policies are dominated.
Policy π5 is the ’least risk, least productivity’ policy, where the manager always selects
state LP . The other non-dominated policies (π1, ..., π4) consider various tradeoffs be-
tween risk and productivity. The manager can then decide on the most preferred
policy from the non-dominated policies, based on his/her own (or the corporation’s)
relative importance of maximizing the productivity measure and minimizing the risk
measure.
Baseline policy b1 assumes that the manager always selects state FP , presumably
with the intent of maximizing productivity. However, always selecting FP also max-
imizes the facility’s vulnerability to an attack, which in turn reduces the total long
run productivity of the facility. Baseline policy b2 alternates between FP and LP.
Interestingly, b2 has a higher measure of productivity and a lower measure of risk
than b1 (i.e., b2 dominates b1), pointing out the importance of considering risk when
striving for increased productivity.
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Table 2.6: Non-dominated policies v.s. Baseline policies
{zL(t), sL(t)} π1 π2 π3 π4
(FP, T1 under threat) “Go to LP” “Go to LP” ”Stay” ”Stay”
(FP, T2 under threat) ”Stay” “Go to LP” “Go to LP” “Go to LP”
(FP, No threat) “Go to LP” “Go to LP” ”Stay” ”Stay”
(LP, T1 under threat) ”Go to FP” ”Go to FP” ”Stay” ”Stay”
(LP, T2 under threat) ”Stay” ”Go to FP” ”Stay” ”Stay”
(LP, No threat) ”Go to FP” ”Stay” ”Go to FP” ”Stay”
(FP, T1 attacked) ”Stop & clean the system”
(FP, T2 attacked) ”Stop & clean the system”
(LP, T1 attacked) ”Stop & clean the system”
(LP, T2 attacked) ”Stop & clean the system”
{zL(t), sL(t)} π5 b1 b2
(FP, T1 under threat) “Go to LP” ”Stay” “Go to LP”
(FP, T2 under threat) “Go to LP” ”Stay” “Go to LP”
(FP, No threat) “Go to LP” ”Stay” “Go to LP”
(LP, T1 under threat) ”Stay” ”Go to FP” ”Go to FP”
(LP, T2 under threat) ”Stay” ”Go to FP” ”Go to FP”
(LP, No threat) ”Stay” ”Go to FP” ”Go to FP”
(FP, T1 attacked) ”Stop & clean the system”
(FP, T2 attacked) ”Stop & clean the system”
(LP, T1 attacked) ”Stop & clean the system”
(LP, T2 attacked) ”Stop & clean the system”
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Table 2.7: Decision Support Table
Policy Productivity Vulnerability









We have blended the POMG, the POMDP, and the MOGA to identify leader poli-
cies that are candidates for a most preferred policy in an infinite horizon, partially
observed, multi-period decision making environment where:
• There are two intelligent and adaptable agents, a leader and a follower, and
each can affect the performance of the other.
• Before the game begins, the leader considers multiple objectives in selecting its
policy. The follower knows the leader’s policy and determines a response policy
that is optimal with respect to the follower’s objective. The policies are fixed
throughout the game once selected.
• At each decision epoch, each agent knows: its past and present states, its past
actions, and the possibly inaccurate observations of the other agent’s past and
present states.
• Each agent’s policy selects actions based on data currently available to the
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agent, and the actions are selected simultaneously at each decision epoch.
We have extended Stackelberg equilibrium and multi-objective decision making to the
POMG. Assuming that the follower selects its policy with complete knowledge of and
in response to the policy selected by the leader, we have constructed a specially struc-
tured POMDP that leads to the determination of a perfect-memory optimal policy
for the follower (Proposition 2.1). We have shown that this POMDP has a computa-
tionally useful sufficient statistic and a value function structure described in terms of
this sufficient statistic. By assuming that the leader policy is a finite-memory policy,
we have shown that the sufficient statistic is finite-dimensional and that at least a
near-optimal perfect-memory policy for the follower is potentially computable. Using
a simple ad-hoc procedure for finding a finite-memory approximation to a perfect-
memory policy, we have found a finite-memory policy for the follower. Assuming
the policies for both agents are finite-memory policies, we have determined a com-
putationally tractable procedure for calculating the fitness measures for the MOGA
(Proposition 2.2). We then are able to compute the fitness measures for each current
generation leader policy. The MOGA uses these fitness measures to create the next
generation of leader policies. The non-dominated set of the final generation of leader
policies created by the MOGA and the fitness measures of each non-dominated leader
policy then represents the output of our process.
The output of the process described in this chapter can serve as the options generation
phase of an option selection process; e.g., a deterministic version of multi-attribute
decision theory (Kenney and Raiffa, 1993). Topics for future research include real-
world applications of the model, an in-depth numerical analysis, and a study of the
value of information, which we will introduce in next chapters.
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The research in this chapter considers the following multi-period stochastic game.
There are two intelligent and adaptive decision-making agents, a leader and a follower.
These agents interact as follows:
• Before the game begins, the follower chooses its policy with complete knowledge
of what policy the leader has chosen.
• Once the game begins, the policies chosen by the leader and follower determine
what actions are simultaneously selected at each decision epoch of an at most
countable number of decision epochs.
• The decisions of both policies affect the dynamics of the system that both agents
want to control.
• Each agent’s policy makes decisions to achieve its agent’s objective, based on
data that include possibly inaccurate, incomplete, and/or costly observations
of the other agent.
The question addressed in this chapter is: how does the accuracy of the leader’s obser-
vation of the follower affect the performance of the leader? A related question: what
is the added value to the leader if more accurate (and presumably, requiring greater
resources) observations of the follower could be made available? Another related
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question: is it guaranteed that more accurate information about the follower will im-
prove leader performance? We use a leader-follower partially observed Markov game
(POMG) to model and address these “value of information” questions by building on
previous research presented in Chapter 2, specialized to the case where the leader has
a single objective (the leader was assumed to have multi-objectives in Chapter 2.
It seems intuitive that more accurate observations of the underlying state of a system
subject to control will lead to better system performance. Better medical diagnos-
tic quality should lead to healthier patient outcomes; higher quality machine fault
identification should lead to more effective machine maintenance and better system
performance; more accurate observations of an adversary or a competitor should pro-
vide advantage. However, several counterexamples to this claim for the partially
observed Markov decision process (POMDP), a single-agent decision making model,
have been found in Ortiz, Erera and White (2013).
The assumption that the follower has complete knowledge of the leader’s policy is
realistic in many applications and can serve as a worst-case scenario (“erring” in the
right direction) otherwise. With respect to realism, if the leader is defending a key
infrastructure site and the follower’s objective involves breaching site security, the
follower may have at least partial knowledge of the leader’s policy by observing the
leader’s allocation of defensive resources. Also, the follower may be able to infer, at
least in part, the leader’s policy from sources such as publicly available information if,
for example, the leader is associated with a government agency with open records. We
remark that the underlining state of each agent is only partially observed by the other
agent and hence each agent’s policy selects actions based on data different from the
other agent’s data. Thus, in general the follower will not know exactly what action
the leader will take, which may mollify concern in situations where the leader-follower
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assumption is believed to unrealistically bias results to the advantage of the follower.
The intent of the research is to better inform the decision to seek or not seek improved
state observation quality and what resulting changes in performance to expect if state
observation quality is improved. The initial motivation for this research was how to
support a manager of a food supply chain (the leader) in selecting a sequence of ac-
tions that best balances maximizing the performance of, while minimizing the risk to,
the supply chain over time, given that there is an attacker (the follower) who seeks to
contaminate the food supply chain with a chemical or biological toxin. More specif-
ically in the context of this application, if the manager (or a government agency) is
able to improve the quality of observing the attacker (presumably at a cost), is it
useful to do so? Details of this application can be found in Chapter 2. A detailed
discussion of the reasons behind the interest in measures of risk and risk mitigation
when an adversary is intelligent and adaptive can be found in Ezell, et al., (2010).
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents a review of the literature.
We consider the single agent case in Section 3.3. This case and its associated value
determination are important for results to follow and are the basis of the solution
procedure for the POMG found Chapter 2 because:
• Given a leader policy, the (two-agent) POMG can be transformed into a (single
agent, potentially tractable) POMDP that determines the follower’s response
policy.
• Computing the value of either the leader’s objective function or the follower’s
objective function requires both a leader’s policy and a follower’s policy.
The POMDP problem statement and preliminary results from the literature are pre-
sented in Section 3.3.1 through 3.3.3. We summarize two definitions of observation
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quality and related results from the literature. Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.1 present
conditions that guarantee that improved observation quality insures improved system
performance for the first definition. Results with respect to the second definition show
that improved observation quality may degrade system performance. We then com-
pare and contrast these two definitions in Section 3.3.4.
Section 3.4 considers the POMG. Two descriptions of the value functions useful for
later results are presented in Section 3.4.2, following the definition of the POMG in
Section 3.4.1. In Section 3.4.3, we present a partition of the set of all observation ma-
trices that describe the leader’s observations of the follower’s underlying state. Each
element of this partition contains observation matrices that share a common follower
policy. Section 3.4.4 studies the impact on the leader’s value function of changing
observation quality within a partition element. We (1) extend the POMDP results to
the POMG under these circumstances, (2) show that the value function is Lipschitz
continuous in observation quality, and then (3) present conditions that guarantee that
if an observation matrix is a member of one of the partition elements and a second
observation is sufficiently close to the first observation matrix, then the second ob-
servation matrix is also a member of the same partition element. In Section 3.4.5, we
examine the implications of changing the observation matrix to an observation matrix
in a different partition element. We show by example that crossing partition element
boundaries may produce discontinuities in the leader’s value function. We give con-
ditions that guarantee that a discontinuity will be favorable to leader performance
when such a discontinuity occurs. We show that when both agents are collaborative
and the follower initially has complete observability of the leader, then discontinuities
cannot occur. However, we show by example that improving observation quality does




The POMDP is a sequential decision making model involving a single decision maker.
Compared to the completely observed Markov decision process (i.e., the MDP; see
Puterman 1994), the POMDP takes into consideration inaccurate, incomplete, and/or
costly observations of the state of the system under control. However, the POMDP
also introduces significant computational challenges. In the past decades, structural
properties of the value function and computational procedures for the POMDP have
been investigated and can be found in Smallwood and Sondik (1973), Sondik (1978),
Monahan (1982), White and Scherer (1989), Lovejoy (1991), White (1991), Littman
(1994), Cassandra, Kaelbling and Littman (1994), Cassandra, Littman and Zhang
(1997), Lin, Bean and White (1998, 2004), and Zhang (2010). Finite memory con-
trollers for the POMDP have also been examined by Platzman (1977, 1980), White
and Scherer (1994), Meuleau et al. (1999), and Poupart and Boutilier (2004). The
finite memory controller for the POMDP in White and Scherer (1994) is extended to
the POMG in this chapter.
The value of information for the POMDP has been addressed in White and Harring-
ton (1980), Zhang (2010) and Ortiz, Erera and White (2013). This research has shown
that for some sub-optimal policies, the value function may not necessarily improve if
provided with more accurate state observations. We remark that there are results in
the decision analysis literature (e.g., Wakker, 1988) that address situations where the
value of information may be negative. A comparison of the results in the POMDP
literature with the condition in Wakker (1988) is a topic of future research. The
definitions of observation quality presented in the POMDP literature are compared
and used in this chapter in order to study the value of information for POMG.
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The stochastic game (Shapley, 1953) is a dynamic game that is played in a sequence
of stages. The state of the system evolves probabilistically over time and is con-
trolled by one or more players. The partially observed stochastic game (POSG) is a
new and relatively unexamined generalization of a stochastic game that represents a
multi-agent sequential decision making problem, where the states of the game are not
precisely observed by the agents and all agents make a sequence of decisions based
on these partial observations. Not surprisingly, the increased modeling realism of
the POSG has resulted in increased computational challenges (see Bernstein et al.
2002, Rabinovich, Goldman and Rosenschein 2003). A dynamic program presented
in Hansen, Bernstein and Zilberstein (2004) and Kumar and Zilberstein (2009) was
used to prune very weakly dominated policies for both agents. Chapter 2 developed
a solution procedure that can generate a set of non-dominated policies for a partially
observed multi-objective Markov game, from which one of two agents (the leader)
can select a most preferred policy to control a dynamic system that is also affected
by the control decisions of the other agent (the follower).
The value of information is a topic of considerable interest in the game theory and
decision analysis literature. Much of this interest has focused on determining the
value of information in games having a single decision epoch and has shown that
the reward can be either improved or degraded when the decision makers are given
more accurate information. For example, research by Li (2002), Chu and Lee (2006)
and Leng and Parlar (2009) have examined the positive value of revealing private
information to coordinate among players in the context of supply chain management
problems. Bier, Oliveros and Samuelson (2007) also examined the advantage of re-
vealing private information to an attacker in a homeland security context. Bassan
et al. (2003) identified a class of games where the value of information is positive.
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Lehrer and Rosenberg (2006) and Meyer, Lehrer and Rosenberg (2010) showed that
the value of information is always positive in a two-person zero-sum game. On the
contrary, Kamien, Tauman and Zamir (1990) presented an example of a card game in
extensive form that has a negative value of information. Zhuang and Bier (2010) ar-
gued that it is better not to reveal private information in a homeland security resource
allocation problem. In multiple period games, Lehrer and Rosenberg (2010) showed
that the value of information is positive for zero-sum repeated games. Zhuang, Bier,
and Alagoz (2010) illustrated the use of secrecy and deception in a multiple-period,
attacker-defender signaling game. To the best of our knowledge, this chapter is the
first to analyze the value of information of general-sum partially observed stochastic
games. We study the value of improving state observation quality within the POMG
framework presented in Chapter 2.
3.3 The Single Agent Case
3.3.1 POMDP Problem Statement
Let {s(t), t = 0, 1, }, {z(t), t = 1, 2, }, and {a(t), t = 0, 1, } be the state, observation,
and action processes, each having finite state spaces S,Z, and A, respectively. The
conditional probability pij(z, a) = P [z(t + 1) = z, s(t + 1) = j|s(t) = i, a(t) = a]
is assumed given. Let P (z, a) be the sub-stochastic matrix {pij(z, a)}. Note that
P [z(t + 1) = z, s(t + 1) = j|s(t) = i, a(t) = a] = P [z(t + 1) = z|s(t + 1) = j, s(t) =
i, a(t) = a] × P [s(t + 1) = j|s(t) = i, a(t) = a], where pij(a) = P [s(t + 1) = j|s(t) =
i, a(t) = a] =
∑






z pij(z, a) 6= 0) are referred to as the transition and obser-
vation probabilities, respectively. Throughout, we will assume qijz(a) is independent
of i and hence qjz(a) = P [z(t + 1) = z|s(t + 1) = j, a(t) = a]. Let Q(a) = {qjz(a)},
be the observation matrix, which we will use as our model of state observation quality.
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We consider two cases for selecting actions, the perfect memory case and the fi-
nite memory case. In both cases, decision epochs are countable, t = 0, 1, . . .. Let
x(0) = {xi(0)}, where xi(0) = P [s(0) = i], d(t) = {z(t), . . . , z(1), a(t− 1), . . . , a(0)},
and d(t, τ) = {z(t), . . . , z(t− τ + 1), a(t− 1), . . . , a(t− τ)}, where τ is fixed and finite
and can be thought of as a design parameter. For the perfect memory case, a(0) is
selected on the basis of x(0) and for t ≥ 1, a(t) is selected on the basis of {d(t), x(0)}.
For the finite memory case, a(t) is selected on the basis of d(t, τ), where d(0, τ) is
assumed given.
Let r(i, a) be the reward received at epoch t, given s(t) = i and a(t) = a. The criterion




tr(s(t), a(t))|x(0)}, where E{.|x(0)} is the expectation operator conditioned
on x(0) and where we will assume the discount factor β is such that 0 ≤ β < 1. The
POMDP has two fundamental objectives. First, determine the value of the criterion
for any given policy. Second, determine a policy (an optimal policy) that maximizes
the criterion and its criterion value. Our interest in the POMDP formulation is to
determine the value of the criterion for a given policy, to understand how this value
changes as the observation matrix changes, and to extend these results to the POMG
where appropriate.
3.3.2 Perfect Memory Case
We now assume all policies are perfect memory policies.
Value Determination. Let vπQ(d(t)) be the value of the criterion, assuming {d(t), x(0)}
(for notational simplicity we delete explicit dependence on x(0)), π is the policy under
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P [z(t+ 1) = z|d(t), a(t)]vπQ(z, d(t), a(t)), (3.1)
where a(t) = π(d(t)). A simple contraction mapping argument guarantees that Equa-
tion (3.1) has a unique solution.
Let v∗Q(d(t)) = maxπ v
πQ(d(t)). Results in Bertsekas (1976) show that v∗Q(d(t))










P [z(t+ 1) = z|d(t), a]v∗Q(z, d(t), a)}. (3.2)
Further, the perfect memory policy that causes the maximum to be attained is an
optimal perfect memory policy.
Sufficient Statistic. Due to computational tractability concerns, we seek a t-
invariant sufficient statistic, observing that d(t) gets large as t gets large. According
to Bertsekas (1976), there exists an optimal policy that depends on d(t) only through
x(t) = {xi(t)}, where xi(t) = P [s(t) = i|d(t)]; i.e., {x(t), t = 0, 1, . . .} is a suffi-
cient statistic for the optimization problem. Furthermore, v∗Q depends on d(t) only






σ(z, x, a)v∗Q(λ(z, x, a))}, (3.3)
where the policy that causes the maximum to be attained is an optimal policy, xr(a) =∑




j pij(a)qjz(a) = xP (z, a)1 (y1 =
∑
i yi for any vector





σ(z, x, a) 6= 0. We remark that σ(z, x, a) = P [z(t+ 1) = z|d(t), a(t) = a] when x(t) =
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x and x(t+1) = λ(z, x, a) when z(t+1) = z, x(t) = x, and a(t) = a. Hence, λ(z, x, a)
is a form of Bayes’ Rule. A result that is often exploited computationally is that the
successive approximations operation preserves concavity and piecewise linearity; i.e.,
if v is concave and piecewise linear, then maxa{xr(a) + β
∑
z σ(z, x, a)v(λ(z, x, a))}
is also concave and piecewise linear. In the limit, concavity is preserved, and hence
it is also true that v∗Q(x) is concave.
If we restrict our attention to the class of perfect memory policies that depend on
d(t) only through x(t), then it is straightforward to show that vπQ(d(t)) depends on
d(t) only through x(t) and satisfies the equation
vπQ(x) = xr(π(x)) + β
∑
z
σ(z, x, π(x))vπQ(λ(z, x, π(x))). (3.4)
State Observation Quality. We now consider the first definition of observation
quality presented in White and Harrington (1980) and Zhang (2010).
Definition 3.1. Observation matrix Q′ is at least as informative as observation ma-
trix Q if there exists a stochastic matrix R such that Q′(a)R(a) = Q(a) for all a.
Theorem 3.1. Assume that observation matrix Q′ is at least as informative (in terms
of Definition 1) as observation matrix Q. Let vπQ(x) be the solution of Equation 3.4,
and assume vπQ(x) is concave in x. Then, vπQ(x) ≤ vπQ′(x) for all x.
Proof of Theorem 3.1 is given in White and Harrington (1980).
A policy is said to be Q-adaptive if when given a more informative observation ma-
trix, the policy gives in return improved performance. Theorem 3.1 states that if vπQ
is concave, then π is Q-adaptive. Theorem 3.1 leads to the following results.
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Corollary 3.1. (a) Assume π is optimal for observation matrix Q, π′ is optimal for
observation matrix Q′, and that observation matrix Q′ is at least as informative as
observation matrix Q (in terms of Definition 1). Then, vπQ(x) ≤ vπ′Q′(x) for all
x. (b) Assume Q has rank 1 and Q′′ = I, where I is the identity matrix, and let
π and π′′ be optimal policies for observation matrices Q and Q′′, respectively. Let
Q′ be any observation matrix, and assume π′ is an optimal policy for Q′. Then,
vπQ(x) ≤ vπ′Q′(x) ≤ vπ′′Q′′(x) for all x.
Corollary 3.1(a) results from the fact that an optimal policy always produces a con-
cave value function. Corollary 3.1(b) notes that there is an observation matrix (or
family of matrices) for which any given observation matrix is at least as informative,
and there is an observation matrix (or family of matrices) that is at least as informa-
tive as any given observation matrix. The POMDP based on the former observation
matrix (having rank 1) is called the completely unobserved case, and the POMDP
based on the latter observation matrix (the identity matrix) is called the completely
observed case (or simply, the MDP). The value functions of these special cases rep-
resent lower and upper bounds, respectively, on the value function of the general case.
3.3.3 Finite Memory Case
We now state an alternative definition of observation quality presented in Ortiz,
Erera and White (2013), assuming that the underlying state of the system is close
to completely observed (e.g., true for many inventory systems) and that all policies
considered are finite-memory.
Definition 3.2. Let Q(ε) = I(1− ε) +Pε, P is a stochastic matrix with zeros on the
diagonal, and ε ≥ 0 is small. Observation matrix Q(ε′) is at least as informative as
observation matrix Q(ε) if and only if ε′ ≤ ε.
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Results in Ortiz, Erera and White (2013) state that for finite-memory policy π,
vπQ(x) = λτ (d(t, τ), x′)γ(d(t, τ)),
where x = x(t) = λτ (d(t, τ), x′) given x′ = x(t − τ) and γ(d(t, τ)) is polynomial








is well-defined and can be approximated by α0(d(t, τ)) + εα1(d(t, τ)), and hence the
signs of the scalar elements of the vector αk(d(t, τ)) for k = 1 determine whether
or not vπQ(x) will increase or decrease as a function of ε. Not unexpectedly, if the
finite-memory policy under consideration achieves the maximum for the completely
observed MDP, then it is shown in Ortiz, Erera and White (2013) that the signs of
all elements of the vector α1(d(t, τ)) are negative; hence, this policy improves system
performance if given improved observation quality.
3.3.4 A Comparison of Definitions of Observation Quality
We now show that if there exists a stochastic matrix R such that Q(ε)R = Q(ε′), then
for sufficiently small ε and ε′, ε′ ≥ ε > 0. Further, we show that for sufficiently small ε
and ε′, ε′ ≥ ε > 0, there may not exist a stochastic matrix R such that Q(ε)R = Q(ε′).
Thus, for an observation matrix having the specialized form Q(ε) = I(1 − ε) + Pε,
where ε ≥ 0 is small and P is a stochastic matrix with zeros on the diagonal, the def-
inition “Q(ε) is at least as informative as Q(ε′) when ε′ ≥ ε > 0” is more general than
the definition “Q(ε) is at least as informative as Q(ε′) when there exists a stochastic
matrix R such that Q(ε)R = Q(ε′)”.
We now determine that the existence of a stochastic matrix R such that if Q(ε)R =
Q(ε′) implies ε′ ≥ ε > 0 for sufficiently small ε and ε′. Equivalently, if ε′ < ε, then
91
Q(ε)−1Q(ε′) cannot be stochastic, assuming the existence of Q(ε)−1. Assume ε′ < ε,




1−ε′ . Then, Q(ε)
−1Q(ε′) = (1−ε
′)
1−ε (I + κP )
−1(I + κ′P ).
Since κ < 1 for ε sufficiently small and (I + κP )−1 = I − κP (I + κP )−1, it follows
that (I + κP )−1 =
∑
(−1)nκnP n, where the sum is over all n = 0, 1, 2, . . .. It is then
straightforward to show that (I+κP )−1(I+κ′P ) = I+(κ′−κ)P (I−κP+κ2P 2− . . .),
which can be approximated by I + (κ′ − κ)P for small κ. Thus, for i 6= j, the (i, j)th
term of R = Q(ε)−1Q(ε′) is rij = (1 − ε′)(κ′ − κ)pij/(1 − ε), which is negative since
ε′ < ε, and the result is proved.
If ε′ > ε > 0 (both small), does there exist a stochastic matrix R such that Q(ε)R =
Q(ε′)? Such a stochastic matrix exists when the state and observation spaces have
cardinality 2 (let r11 = r22 = (1 − ε − ε′)/(1 − 2ε) and r12 = r21 = (ε′ − ε)/(1 − 2ε),
for ε < 1
2
and (ε′ + ε) < 1). However, the existence of such a stochastic matrix R is
not guaranteed for larger dimensional problems. For example, let
Q(ε) =

1− ε ε 0
0 1− ε ε







1− 2ε −ε(1− ε) ε2
0 (1− ε)2 −ε(1− ε)
0 −ε(1− ε) (1− ε)2
 ,
where the inverse exists when ε < 1
2
. We observe that the (1, 3) entry of R =
Q(ε)−1Q(ε′) is r13 = − ε(ε
′−ε)
(1−ε)(1−2ε) < 0, and hence R, although unique, is not stochas-
tic. Thus, if ε′ > ε > 0, it is not guaranteed that there exists a stochastic matrix R
such that Q(ε)R = Q(ε′).
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3.4 Partially Observed Markov Game
3.4.1 Problem Statement
Thus far, we have explored the impact of changes to the observation quality of the
underlying state process on system performance for the POMDP and have presented
results that address the question: will improved observation quality improve system
performance? Given this context, we now investigate this question for the infinite
horizon, expected total discounted POMG.
We assume that the POMG has two agents. The first agent, the leader, chooses its
policy. Then the second agent, the follower, selects its policy with complete knowledge
of the policy selected by the leader. Let {sk(t), t = 0, 1, . . .}, {zk(t), t = 1, . . .}, and
{ak(t), t = 0, 1, . . .} be the state, observation, and action processes for agent k ∈ {L =
Leader, F = Follower}, each having finite state spaces Sk, Zk, and Ak, respectively.
Let s(t) = {sL(t), sF (t)}, z(t) = {zL(t), zF (t)}, and a(t) = {aL(t), aF (t)}, where zk(t)
is the observation received by agent k of the other agent’s state. The conditional
probability pij(z, a) = P [z(t+1) = z, s(t+1) = j|s(t) = i, a(t) = a] is assumed given.
Let P (z, a) be the sub-stochastic matrix {pij(z, a)}.
Let the information pattern at time t of finite length τ for agent k be dk(t, τ) =
{sk(t), ..., sk(t− τ + 1), zk(t), ..., zk(t− τ + 1), ak(t−1), ..., ak(t− τ)}, hence, dk(t, τ) =
{sk(t), zk(t), ak(t − 1), dk(t − 1, τ − 1)}. And let yk(t) = {P (dl(t, τ)|dk(t))} for
l 6= k, where yk(t) is a “belief” array that indicates what agent k can infer about
the other agent’s information pattern, i.e., dl(t, τ), l 6= k, l, k ∈ {L, F}. Denote
dk(t) = {zk(t), ..., zk(1), sk(t), ..., sk(0), ak(t − 1), ..., ak(0), yk(0)} when t ≥ 1, where
yk(0) = {P (dl(0, τ))}, hence, dk(t) = {zk(t), sk(t), ak(t− 1), dk(t− 1)}. The decision
epochs are t = 0, 1, . . ., and agent k selects ak(t) on the basis of information pattern
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dk(t, τ). Hence, when selecting an action, we assume that agent k knows the current
and τ most recent observations of the other agent’s state, its current and τ most recent
state values, and the τ most recent actions it has selected. Let vk(πL, πF , Q)(dk(0))
be the value of agent k’s criterion, assuming the leader and follower policies are πL
and πF , respectively, and Q = {P (zL|sF )} is the leader’s observation matrix. We let
d(t, τ) = {dL(t, τ), dF (t, τ)}. It will be convenient to describe the policy pair (πL, πF )
as {P (a(t)|d(t, τ))}, where P (a(t)|d(t, τ)) = P (aL(t)|dL(t, τ))P (aF (t)|dF (t, τ)).
The criterion we consider for agent k is the infinite horizon, expected total discounted
reward; i.e., vk(πL, πF , Q)(dk(0)) = E{
∑
t β
trk(s(t), a(t))|dk(0)}, where E{.|dk(0)} is
the expectation operator conditioned on dk(0), β ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor, and
rk(i, a) is the scalar reward received by agent k at epoch t, given s(t) = i and a(t) = a.
Let Q be the set of all stochastic matrices and hence the set of all observation
matrices Q = {P (zL|sF )}. We remark that Q is equivalent to the set of all el-
ements in R|S
F | × R(|ZL|−1) such that qjz ≥ 0 for all j ∈ SF and z ∈ ZL, and∑|zL|−1
z=1 qjz ≤ 1 for all j ∈ SF . For example, if |SF | = |ZL| = 2, then Q is equivalent
to {(x, y) : 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1}. Hence, Q is compact.
Assume initial conditions dL(0) and dF (0) are given. Let ΠL and ΠF be the set of all
policies from which the leader and the follower can choose, respectively. Both ΠL and
ΠF are assumed to contain only finite-memory policies. Let the response function of
the follower π∗ : ΠL ×Q → ΠF be such that ∀πL ∈ ΠL,
vF (πL, π∗(πL, Q))(dF (0)) ≥ vF (πL, ρF )(dF (0)),∀ρF ∈ ΠF .
Then, the equilibrium conditions for the POMG are:
(i) vL(πL, π∗(πL, Q))(dL(0)) ≥ vL(ρL, π∗(ρL, Q)))(dL(0)),∀ρL ∈ ΠL;
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(ii) ∀ρL ∈ ΠL, vF (ρL, π∗(ρL, Q))(dF (0)) ≥ vF (ρL, ρF )(dF (0)),∀ρF ∈ ΠF .
Hence, neither the leader nor the follower can improve its performance by deviating
from the equilibrium condition.
Our focus in this chapter is to determine vL(ρL, π∗(ρL, Q), Q)(dL(0)) for any given
ρL ∈ ΠL. We assume that determining this scalar value is a critical step in de-
termining the most preferred leader policy in ΠL. We note that a genetic algo-
rithm was used in Chapter 2 to determine the most preferred leader policy, using
vL(ρL, π∗(ρL, Q), Q)(dL(0)) as the fitness measure.
3.4.2 Descriptions of vk, k ∈ {L, F}
We now present two descriptions of vk in Proposition 3.1 and Proposition 3.2 that
will be useful in determining results below. The first description describes vk in a
manner analogous to the description of the optimality equation for the POMDP. The
second description takes advantage of the fact that both leader and follower policies
are assumed to be finite memory policies.
Proposition 2.2 in Chapter 2 implies that {dk(t, τ), yk(t)} is a sufficient statistic for
{dk(t)}, and hence vk(πL, πF , Q)(dk(t)) = vk(πL, πF , Q)(dk(t, τ), yk(t)).
Let one-period information for agent k be ςk(t) = {zk(t), sk(t), ak(t− 1)} and ς(t) =
{ςL(t), ςF (t)}. Define





dl(t,τ) P (z(t+1), s(t+1)|s(t), a(t))P (a(t)|d(t, τ))P (dl(t, τ)|dk(t, τ)), l 6=
k
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(ii) λk(ςk(t+ 1), dk(t, τ), yk(t)) is the stochastic array with scalar element
P (ς l(t+ 1), dl(t, τ − 1)|ςk(t+ 1), dk(t)) = P (ς(t+ 1), d








P (z(t+ 1), s(t+ 1)|s(t), a(t))P (a(t)|d(t, τ))P (dl(t, τ)|dk(t)), l 6= k,
and where we assume P (ςk(t+ 1)|dk(t)) 6= 0.
Proposition 3.1. For policies πL and πF and observation matrix Q,













σk(ςk(t+ 1), dk(t, τ), yk(t))
× vk(πL, πF , Q)({ςk(t+ 1), dk(t, τ − 1)}, λk(ςk(t+ 1), dk(t, τ), yk(t))), l 6= k.
Proof follows the proof of Proposition 2.2 in Chapter 2.
We now present a sufficient statistic and a structured result for vk after the following
definition. Let gk be the solution to the equation
gk(d(t, τ), πL, πF , Q)
= Rk(d(t, τ), πL, πF ) + β
∑
ς(t+1)
P (ς(t+ 1)|d(t, τ), πL, πF , Q)
× gk({ς(t+ 1), d(t, τ − 1)}, πL, πF , Q),
where
Rk(d(t, τ), πL, πF ) =
∑
a(t)
rk(s(t), a(t))P (a(t)|d(t, τ)).
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Proposition 3.2. For policies πL and πF and observation matrix Q,




P (dl(t, τ)|dk(t))gk(d(t, τ), πL, πF , Q), l 6= k.
Proof follows from Lemma 1 in Ortiz, Erera and White (2013) and Proposition 2.2
in Chapter 2.
3.4.3 Partition of Observation Matrices
Let K(πL, πF ) = {Q ∈ Q : vF (πL, πF , Q)(dF (0)) ≥ vF (πL, ρF , Q)(dF (0)),∀ρF ∈ ΠF}.
Thus, K(πL, πF ) is the set of all matrices Q = {P (zL|sF )} such that given πL, the
follower will select policy πF (i.e., π∗(πL, Q) = πF ). We assume that the policies in ΠF
have been selected so that if πF , ρF ∈ ΠF and πF 6= ρF , then K(πL, πF ) ∩K(πL, ρF )
may be non-empty but has (Lebesgue) measure zero. Thus, {K(πL, ρF ) : ρF ∈ ΠF}
is a finite partition of Q (permitting non-empty intersections when equalities occur);
hence, there exists at least one element of this partition that has a non-empty interior.
We assume that the follower selects πF in order to maximize its criterion value. Thus,
if Q is a member of only K(πL, πF ), then the follower will select πF in response to
the leader selecting πL. If Q ∈ K(πL, πF ) ∩K(πL, ρF ), then either πF or ρF may be
selected. We assume that the leader has complete knowledge of {K(πL, ρF ) : ρF ∈
ΠF}. We remark that K(πL, πF ) for each πF ∈ ΠF is compact. Figure 3.1 is an
illustration of a partition over Q = {(x, y) : 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1}, where different
colored regions correspond to different response policies ρF .
3.4.4 Changing Q Within A Partition Element
We now examine the impact on vL(πL, πF , Q)(dL(t)) of changing Q toQ′ whenQ,Q′ ∈
K(πL, πF ). We begin by extending Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.1 to the POMG. We
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Figure 3.1: An Example of a Partition Over Q = {(x, y) : 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1}.
then show that vL(πL, πF , Q)(dL(t)) is Lipschitz continuous on K(πL, πF ). Finally,
we present conditions that guarantee two sufficiently close observation matrices are
members of the same element of the partition {K(πL, ρF ) : ρF ∈ ΠF}.
Corollary 3.2. Assume Q,Q′ ∈ K(πL, πF ) and there is a R ∈ Q such that Q′R = Q.
(i) If vL(πL, πF , Q)(dL(t, τ), yL(t)) is concave in yL(t) for dL(t, τ), then
vL(πL, πF , Q′)(dL(t, τ), yL(t)) ≥ vL(πL, πF , Q)(dL(t, τ), yL(t)).
(ii) Let πL be such that
vL(πL, πF , Q)(dL(t, τ), yL(t)) ≥ vL(ρL, π∗(ρL, Q), Q)(dL(t, τ), yL(t))
for all ρL ∈ ΠL. Then,
vL(πL, πF , Q′)(dL(t, τ), yL(t)) ≥ vL(πL, πF , Q)(dL(t, τ), yL(t)).
Proof. (i) follows directly from Theorem 3.1 and Proposition 3.1. It is sufficient to
show that vL(πL, πF , Q)(dL(t, τ), yL(t)) is concave in yL(t) for (ii) to hold. It follows
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from Proposition 3.2 that





P (dF (t, τ)|dL(t))gL(d(t, τ), ρL, π∗(ρL, Q), Q),
which is concave in yL(t).
Thus, within an element of {K(πL, ρF ) : ρF ∈ ΠF}, Corollary 3.2 gives conditions
that insure improved observation quality (based on Definition 3.1) will improve the
leader’s value function. We remark that Corollary 3.2 essentially extends the notion
of Q-adaptivity to a pair of policies (πL, πF ) when Q,Q′ ∈ K(πL, πF ).
We note that ΠL and ΠF may not contain a πL and a π∗(πL, Q) such that these
equilibrium conditions hold for all initial conditions. Determining conditions that
guarantee the existence of such policies is a future research topic.
We now show that for all dL(t) and for any pair of finite-memory policies (πL, πF ),
vL(πL, πF , Q)(dL(t)) is Lipschitz continuous in Q on K(πL, πF ).
Proposition 3.3. For all (dL(t, τ), yL(t)) and for any pair of finite-memory policies
(πL, πF ), vL(πL, πF , Q)(dL(t, τ), yL(t)) is Lipschitz continuous in Q on K(πL, πF ).
Proof. For any scalar valued function v dependent on (d(t, τ)), define




P (ς(t+ 1)|d(t, τ), πL, πF , Q)× v({ς(t+ 1), d(t, τ − 1)}).
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Define H ′ identically to H but replace Q by Q′, where we note:




P (a(t)|d(t, τ))P (zL(t+ 1)|sF (t+ 1))P (zF (t+ 1), s(t+ 1)|s(t), a(t)).
Let g and g′ be the fixed points of H and H ′, respectively (Existence and uniqueness
of these fixed points are assured by Theorem 6.2.3 in Puterman 1994). Then,











P (z(t+ 1), s(t+ 1)|s(t), a(t))






[P (zL(t+ 1)|sF (t+ 1))− P ′(zL(t+ 1)|sF (t+ 1))]P (zF (t+ 1), s(t+ 1)|s(t), a(t))
× g′({ς(t+ 1), d(t, τ − 1)})
Note, ||g′|| ≤ M
1−β , where M = maxs maxa r
L(s, a). Then, it is straightforward to
show that
||g − g′|| ≤ β||g − g′||+ β||Q−Q′|| M
1− β
and hence,
||g − g′|| ≤ βM
(1− β)2
||Q−Q′||.
Thus, as long as we remain in one of the elements of the partition {K(πL, ρF ) : ρF ∈
ΠF}, vL(πL, πF , Q)(dL(t, τ), yL(t)) is Lipschitz continuous in Q.
We now present conditions that guarantee that two observation matrices are members
of the same partition element. Consider the following definitions:
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(i) for any vector g, ||g|| = maxs |g(s)|;
(ii) for any matrix Q, ||Q|| = maxj
∑
z∈Z |qjz|.
Define B(ρF ) = vF (πL, πF , Q′)(dF (0))− vF (πL, ρF , Q′)(dF (0)) for a given dF (0), and
b = min{B(ρF ) : ρF ∈ ΠF , ρF 6= πF} ≥ 0.
Proposition 3.4. Assume Q′ ∈ K(πL, πF ). If Q is such that ||Q − Q′|| ≤ b(1−β)
2
2βM
where M = maxs maxa r
L(s, a), then Q ∈ K(πL, πF ).
Proof. If Q is such that
vF (πL, πF , Q)(dF (0))− vF (πL, ρF , Q)(dF (0)) ≥ 0
for all ρF 6= πF , ρF , πF ∈ ΠF and given dF (0), then Q ∈ K(πL, πF ). Note
vF (πL, πF , Q)(dF (0))− vF (πL, ρF , Q)(dF (0))
= vF (πL, πF , Q)(dF (0))− vF (πL, πF , Q′)(dF (0)) + vF (πL, ρF , Q′)(dF (0))




where the inequality follows from Proposition 3.3 and assumptions (ii) and (iii). The
result follows from the fact that b− 2βM
(1−β)2 ||Q−Q




Hence, as long as observation matrices Q and Q′ are close enough, they are in the
same partition element which shares the same response policy. Assume current leader
policy favors more accurate observation quality, Proposition 3.4 indicates how much
the observation quality can improve safely without the follower changing its policy.
Section 3.4.5 will show that when the observation quality is changed large enough so
that the follower changes its policy, discontinuities will occur and these discontinuities
can be beneficial or not beneficial to the leader.
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3.4.5 Changing Q Across Partition Elements
We now examine the impact of changing Q to Q′ on vL(πL, πF , Q)(dL(t, τ), yL(t))
when Q ∈ K(πL, πF ), Q′ ∈ K(πL, ρF ), and πF 6= ρF . Without loss of generality,
assume Q∗ ∈ K(πL, πF )∩K(πL, ρF ), {Qn} is a sequence in K(πL, πF ) that converges
to Q∗, and {Q′n} is a sequence in K(πL, ρF ) that converges to Q∗. Then, from the
Proposition 3.3 and the compactness of K(πL, πF ) and K(πL, ρF ),
lim
n→∞
vL(πL, πF , Qn)(d
L(0)) = vL(πL, πF , Q∗)(dL(0))
lim
n→∞
vL(πL, ρF , Q′n)(d
L(0)) = vL(πL, ρF , Q∗)(dL(0)).
However, there is no guarantee that vL(πL, πF , Q∗)(dL(0)) = vL(πL, ρF , Q∗)(dL(0)),
and hence, at a boundary there can be discontinuities. Figure 3.2 presents a 3-
dimensional view of possible discontinuities at the boundaries of the partition ele-
ments over Q = {(x, y) : 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1}, where different colored regions
correspond to different response policies ρF .
Figure 3.2: An Example of Discontinuities at the Boundaries of the Partition Elements
Over Q = {(x, y) : 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1}
We now show by example a variety of ways that vL can depend on Q as Q moves across
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boundaries in the partition {K(πL, πF ), πF ∈ ΠF}. In order to reduce computational
complexity, we assume that aL(t) depends only on {sL(t), zL(t)} and that the follower
can completely observe the leader’s information {sL(t), zL(t)}. Parameter values for
all examples are presented in Appendix.







 where ε > 0 and is given. Define Q(x) = Q′Rx, then Q(x)
is a stochastic matrix for all x ≥ 0 and Q(x1) is at least as informative as Q(x2) if
0 ≤ x1 ≤ x2.
Note, the Markov chain constructed by R is aperiodic and irreducible, hence there
exists a unique Q∗ such that Q∗ = limx→∞Q




to the completely unobserved case. In addition, the second largest eigenvalue value of
R is 1− 2ε; hence Q(x) converges to Q∗ faster as ε increases.
Figure 3.3 shows the changes in the leader’s value function for a given leader’s policy
as observation quality degrades for six examples. In these examples, only rL(s(t), a(t))
was varied; P (z(t + 1), s(t + 1)|s(t), a(t)) and rF (s(t), a(t)) remained unchanged. A
discontinuity can occur when the change in Q(x) is great enough to cause a change
in the follower’s policy. Note that the leader completely observes the follower when
x = 0, whereas when x is large (x ≥ 20 in these examples), the leader receives no in-
formation about the follower from observations. Regarding the examples in Figure 3.3,
all six have three discontinuities. As x increases, we note discontinuities that produce
abrupt increases or decreases in the leader’s value function, and between the discon-
tinuities we note monotone increasing or decreasing value function performance.
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Figure 3.3: A Variety of Changes to the Leader’s Value Function as Observation
Quality Degrades
The examples have shown that if the leader’s observation matrix changes from Q ∈
K(πL, πF ) to Q′ ∈ K(πL, ρF ), πF 6= ρF , then the leader’s value function may expe-
rience an abrupt change of value due to discontinuities that can occur at partition
boundaries and that these changes can be favorable or unfavorable. We now present
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sufficient conditions that guarantee a favorable change.
Let N = (|ZL||ZF ||SL||SF ||AL||AF |)τ , and assume µ is a one-to-one, onto mapping
from {d(t, τ)}, the set of all d(t, τ), to {1, 2, ..., N}. Thus, µ totally orders {d(t, τ)}.
A function f : {d(t, τ)} → R is said to be isotone (with respect to µ) if and only if
µ(d(t, τ)) ≤ µ(d′(t, τ)) implies f(d(t, τ)) ≤ f(d′(t, τ)).
For any π′ ∈ ΠF and Q ∈ Q, let
q(k|d(t, τ), Q, πL, π′) =
∑
P (ς(t+ 1)|d(t, τ), Q, πL, π′),
where the sum is over all ς(t+ 1) such that µ({ς(t+ 1), d(t, τ − 1)}) ≥ k.
Lemma 3.1. Assume:
(i) RL(d(t, τ), πL, πF ) is isotone in d(t, τ),
(ii) q(k|d(t, τ), Q, πL, πF ) is isotone in d(t, τ) for all k,
Then, gL(d(t, τ), Q, πL, πF ) is isotone in d(t, τ).
The proof follows from Proposition 4.7.3 (Puterman, p. 106) and a standard limit
procedure.
Proposition 3.5. Assume:
(i) Q∗ ∈ K(πL, πF ) ∩K(πL, ρF ), πF 6= ρF ,
(ii) RL(d(t, τ), πL, π′) is isotone in d(t, τ) for π′ ∈ {πF , ρF},
(iii) q(k|d(t, τ), Q∗, πL, π′) is isotone in d(t, τ) for all k for π′ ∈ {πF , ρF},
(iv) RL(d(t, τ), πL, ρF ) ≥ RL(d(t, τ), πL, πF ) for all d(t, τ),
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(v) q(k|d(t, τ), Q∗, πL, ρF ) ≥ q(k|d(t, τ), Q∗, πL, πF ) for all k and all d(t, τ).
Then, gL(d(t, τ), Q∗, πL, ρF ) ≥ gL(d(t, τ), Q∗, πL, πF ) for all d(t, τ), and hence
vL(πL, ρF , Q∗)(dL(0)) ≥ vL(πL, πF , Q∗)(dL(0)).
Proof. Lemma 3.1 guarantees that gL(dL(t, τ), Q∗, πL, π′) for π′ ∈ {πF , ρF} is isotone
in d(t, τ). It follows from Lemma 4.7.2 (Puterman, p. 106) that
∑
ς(t+1)




P (ς(t+ 1)|d(t, τ), Q∗, πL, πF )× gL(d(t, τ)|Q∗, πL, πF ).
Thus,,
gL(d(t, τ), Q∗, πL, πF )
≤ RL(d(t, τ), πL, ρF ) + β
∑
ς(t+1)




= RL(d(t, τ), πL, ρF ) + β
∑
ς(t+1)
P (ς(t+ 1)|d(t, τ), Q∗, πL, ρF )
× v({ς(t+ 1), d(t, τ − 1)}).
Define the sequence {vn} as vn+1 = Hvn, where v0(d(t, τ)) = gL(d(t, τ), Q∗, πL, πF ).
We remark that limn→∞ ||vn − v∗|| = 0, where v∗(d(t, τ)) = gL(d(t, τ), Q∗, πL, ρF ). It
is straightforward to show that v ≤ v′ implies Hv ≤ Hv′. Equation (3.5) has shown
v0 ≤ v1. Lemma 3.1 guarantees that vn is isotone in d(t, τ) for n ≥ 1. Hence, by
induction, vn ≤ vn+1 and therefore vn ≤ v∗ for all n. Thus, gL(d(t, τ), Q∗, πL, πF ) ≤
gL(d(t, τ), Q∗, πL, ρF ) for all d(t, τ) and hence vL(πL, πF , Q∗)(dL(0)) ≤ vL(πL, ρF , Q∗)(dL(0)).
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Proposition 3.5 presents conditions involving both RL(d(t, τ), πL, π′) and P (ς(t +
1)|d(t, τ), Q∗, πL, π′) that suggest a change in observation quality from Q ∈ K(πL, πF )
to Q′ ∈ K(πL, ρF ), where Q and Q′ are both close to Q∗ ∈ K(πL, πF ) ∩K(πL, ρF ),
will improve the leader’s performance.
It is easily shown that the result in Proposition 3.5 holds if
max
d(t,τ)
RL(d(t, τ), πL, πF ) ≤ min
d(t,τ)
RL(d(t, τ), πL, ρF ), (3.6)
which does not require assumptions on P (ς(t + 1)|d(t, τ), Q∗, πL, π′). We remark,
however, that (3.6) is considerably stronger than Assumption (iv) in Proposition 3.5
and hence may be more difficult to be satisfied than the assumptions in Proposition
3.5.
Example 3.2. Consider the problem in Example 3.1, assuming the leader’s informa-
tion can be only partially observed by the follower and P (dL(0)|dF (0)) = 1. Figure
3.4 shows that a favorable change in leader’s value function can occur at partition
boundaries when the assumptions in Proposition 3.5 are satisfied.



















Figure 3.4: Favorable Change in Leader’s Value Function Across the Boundary
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We now examine the situation where the two agents are collaborative (share the
same objective; i.e. rL = rF ) and at least the follower has complete knowledge of
the leader’s initial finite-memory state of knowledge (dL(0, τ)). Under these con-
ditions there will not be a discontinuity in crossing a boundary of the partition
{K(πL, πF ) : πF ∈ ΠF}.
Proposition 3.6. For dL(0) = {dL(0, τ), yL(0)} and dF (0) = {dF (0, τ), yF (0)}, as-
sume:
(i) P (dL(0, τ)|dF (0)) = 1,
(ii) Q∗ ∈ K(πL, πF ) ∩K(πL, ρF ), πF 6= ρF ,
(iii) rL = rF ,
Then, vL(πL, πF , Q∗)(dL(0)) = vL(πL, ρF , Q∗)(dL(0)).
Proof. Assumption (i) implies that vF (πL, π′, Q∗)(dF (0)) = gF (d(0, τ), Q∗, πL, π′) for
π′ ∈ {πF , ρF}.Assumption (ii) implies vF (πL, πF , Q∗)(dF (0)) = vF (πL, ρF , Q∗)(dF (0)).
Hence, gF (d(0, τ), πL, πF ) = gF (d(0, τ), πL, ρF ). Assumption (iii) implies gL = gF .
We now provide several illustrative examples under the conditions assumed in Propo-
sition 3.6.
Example 3.3. Assume the problem in Example 3.1 under the assumptions of Propo-
sition 3.6. Figure 3.5 shows the changes to the leader’s value function as observation
quality degrades for four randomly generated examples. All discontinuity points disap-
pear, and the value function of the leader vL is continuous with respect to observation
matrix Q. However, the slope of the value function vL and its sign can still be negative
or positive due to the changes of the best response policy ρF .
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Figure 3.5: Changes to the leader’s value function as observation quality degrades
under conditions of Proposition 3.6
The implications of these illustrative examples are that even if the two agents are
totally collaborative (i.e., rL = rF ) and initially at least the follower has complete vis-
ibility of the leader’s state (i.e., yF (0) identifies dL(0, τ) with probability 1), improved
observation quality for the leader may or may not improve system performance, before
or after a boundary is crossed. These results indicate that greater visibility between
even collaborative agents may not result in improved system performance. Determin-
ing conditions under which greater visibility between collaborative agents will result
in improved system performance is a topic for future research.
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3.5 Conclusions
We have examined how changes in the accuracy of the leader’s observation of the
follower can affect the leader’s value function. We have given conditions that in-
sure improved observation quality improve the leader’s value function, assuming the
changes in observation quality do not cause the follower to change its policy. We
demonstrated that when changes in observation quality cause the follower to change
its policy, discontinuities in the leader’s value function can result, as a function of
observation quality, and that these discontinuities can be beneficial or not beneficial
to the leader. We showed that when the two agents are collaborative, i.e., share the
same reward structure, and the follower has complete visibility of the leader’s ini-
tial conditions, discontinuities in the leader’s value function do not occur. However,
whether or not the agents in the POMG are collaborative, improved quality of the
leader’s observations of the follower do not necessarily lead to improved leader per-
formance.
This research represents an initial investigation into the impact of observation quality
on performance for the POMG under very specific assumptions (there are two agents,
a leader and a follower, and the follower selects its policy with complete knowledge of
the leader’s policy selection) and with focus on how the leader’s observation quality
of the follower impacts the leader’s value function. Future directions for research on
the interplay between observation quality and control in the context of the POMG
appear numerous.
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CHAPTER IV
RISK ASSESSMENT OF DELIBERATE
CONTAMINATION OF FOOD PRODUCTION
FACILITIES
4.1 Introduction
The deliberate contamination of food is recognized as a major global public health
threat, and food defense is one of the 17 national critical sectors (DHS, 2007) in the
U.S.. The U. S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) budget requests for fiscal
year 2014 have reached $4.7 billion to build a strong and reliable food system (FDA,
2013). Deliberate food contamination can have disastrous impact from both social
and economic perspectives. One of the most well-known examples of deliberate food
contamination is the outbreak of Salmonella Typhimurium that occured in Dalles,
Oregon, in September and October 1984 and sickened 751 people, 45 of whom were
hospitalized (USCB, 2011).
FDA (USDHHS, 2007) has recommended that food industry operators review their
current procedures and controls, assess potential threats and the effectiveness of pre-
ventive measures, and implement enhanced preventive measures. Existing work has
been focused on estimating the probability of an attack at a given target and the con-
sequence of an attack based on statistical data (McGill, Ayyub and Kaminskiy, 2007).
Such analysis does not account the fact that both the attacker and the defender are
intelligent and adaptive and can take action based on possibly inaccurate information
about the other agent. Hence, these probabilities can change as the current situation
changes and may be affected by the accuracy of the observations. To overcome these
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difficulties, we use a game with multiple decision epochs to describe the sequential
interaction between the defender and the attacker, extending the current literature
(Bier, Oliveros and Samuelson, 2007; Bier et al., 2008; Hao, Jin and Zhuang, 2009;
Levitin and Hausken, 2010), which has focused on the allocation of resources to re-
duce risk based on a single decision epoch decision making assumption. We remark
that using models of sequential decision making for multiple agents with inaccurate
information is a relatively unexamined area in risk analysis.
We use a leader-follower two-agent, partially observed Markov game (POMG) in
Chapter 2 as our model. The agents interact as follows:
• Before the game begins, the follower (the attacker) chooses its best response
policy with complete knowledge of what policy the leader (the defender) has
chosen.
• Once the game begins, the policies chosen by the leader and the follower de-
termine what action to select at each decision epoch of an at most countable
number of decision epochs.
• The dynamics of the system is controlled by the actions of both agents.
• Each agent’s policy determines the action to take at each decision epoch, based
on data that include possibly inaccurate, incomplete, and/or costly observations
of the other agent.
Compared to the existing risk analysis methods, our approach has the following ad-
vantages:
• It explicitly considers the interaction between the defender and the attacker
over time.
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• Both the defender’s and the attacker’s actions are selected on the basis of data
collected at current and past decision epochs.
• The data collected at each decision epoch by each agent may include possibly in-
accurate, incomplete, and/or costly observations of the other agent. Hence, our
risk analysis model can be used to analyze the impact of information accuracy
on the risk assessment and mitigation.
• It can consider multiple objectives for the defender.
We remark that although our risk analysis approach was developed to model liquid
eggs production, our approach can be applied to a much broader class of problems
than those involving food supply chains.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We review the existing risk
assessment literature in Section 4.2. We describe our risk analysis tool in Section
4.3, which is comprised of two components: a consequence assessment tool in Section
4.3.1 and a game theoretic optimization model in Section 4.3.2. Section 4.3.3 outlines
the solution procedure. Section 4.3.4 considers four cases in terms of information
asymmetry. Numerical results for a simple model of a liquid egg production facility
are presented in Section 4.4. Section 4.4.1 summarizes the runtime results of our
approach. Section 4.4.2 presents results for the base model. Section 4.4.3 presents
a comparison of the defender’s performance for four types of information asymmetry
and how the defender’s performance improves as data accuracy improves, represent-
ing an analysis of value of information. We also analyze how the characteristics
of the defender’s policies differ for each type of data accuracy asymmetry. Section
4.4.4 illustrates how system risk can be dynamic as a result of the strategic interac-
tion between the defender and the attacker. We show how a defender’s policy can
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redirect the attacker’s interests to less vulnerable targets and lengthen the expected
time till an attack occurs. A sensitivity analysis is performed in Section 4.4.5 in order
to identify particularly sensitive parameters. Conclusions are presented in Section 4.5.
4.2 Related Literature
Existing risk analysis tools for food industry include CARVER+Shock (Clark and
Philpott, 2011), Food & Agriculture Sector-Criticality Assessment (FASCAT), bioter-
rorism terrorism risk assessment (BTRA) (NCFPD report 2007 - 2011), Opera-
tional Risk Management (ORM) (Headquarters Marine Corps, 2002), and FDA iRisk
(FDACFS, 2012). These tools assume that risk is static in time. In the broader
risk analysis literature, risk assessment may include uncertainties associated with
risk scenarios, consequences, responses of agents, and the dynamics of the system.
Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) has been a major tool for characterizing these
uncertainties and estimating structural reliability and risk (Ezell et al., 2010). Refer-
ences of McGill, Ayyub and Kaminskiy (2007) and Rosoff and von Winterfeldt (2010)
define adversarial risk as
∑
A P (Success|A)C(A)P (A), where P (A) is the probability
that attack A will occur; P (Success|A) is the probability that attack A will be suc-
cessful, given that attack A has occurred; and C(A) is the consequence that results
(such as measures of morbidity, mortality, economic or societal impact) if attack A
is successful. Quantifying P (A) is particularly challenging, and approaches for elic-
iting such probabilities from experts are summarized in Bedford and Cooke (2001)
and Hora (2007). References of Cox (2008, 2009) and Brown and Cox (2011) have
pointed out the limitations of PRA and have indicated that these limitations can
produce decisions that result in an increased risk of attack. A major challenge is how
to assess probabilities that are in reality not static, since an adversary may change
tactics when defensive resource allocations change. Reference of Ezell et al. (2010)
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has stated that the probabilities (and corresponding risk) estimated based on the
current state of information can only serve as a baseline. Reference of Bompard et
al. (2009) also has pointed out the importance of modeling the strategic interaction
between adversaries in security analysis.
Game theory is a natural basis for modeling interacting decision makers with differ-
ent information structures and/or different objectives. References of Bier, Oliveros
and Samuelson (2007), Bier et al. (2008), Hao, Jin and Zhuang (2009), Levitin and
Hausken (2010), and Shan and Zhuang (2013) have examined how to allocate defen-
sive resources in order to reduce expected risk for a single decision epoch game. The
resource allocation problem that considers terrorism and natural disasters simulta-
neously is studied in Powell (2007a, 2007b), Golany et al. (2009), and Levitin and
Hausken (2009). Bi- and tri-level optimization extensive game models are used in
Brown et al. (2006) to study critical infrastructure protection issues. Reference of
Sandler and Siqueira (2009) showed how uncovering information about terrorists’ tar-
geting preferences could (counterintuitively) increase a government’s vulnerability to
a terrorist attack. In reality, it is very likely that neither the defender nor the attacker
knows the rewards, objectives, actions, and beliefs of the other agent. Hence, more
recent studies have developed defender-attacker models using incomplete information.
For example, Bier et al. (2008) studied how to allocate a defensive budget when the
defender’s uncertainty about the attacker’s target valuations follows a two-parameter
Rayleigh distribution. The value of the defender disclosing its information to the
public has also been investigated in Zhuang and Bier (2010, 2011).
The majority of the above research was based on single decision epoch games. How-
ever, such games cannot fully describe a dynamic decision-making environment and
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the adaptive nature of terrorist (and defender) behavior over time. To this end, dif-
ferential games have been used in Feichtinger and Novak (2008) to study the strategic
interactions of Western governments and terrorist organizations over time. A two-
stage repeated game in which the agents are myoptic in each period was studied in
Hausken and Zhuang (2011, 2012) in order to study the timing and deterrence of
terrorist attacks and defensive resource allocations. A repeated signaling game with
incomplete information was used in Zhuang, Bier and Alagoz (2010), and the authors
showed that the defender’s objectives can be improved by secrecy and deception.
The stochastic game is an ideal model for the situation where the attacker has to
transition through successive states to probe a system before an attack. Reference
of Bakir and Kardes (2011) studied container security using a completely observed
stochastic game that can consider the uncertainties associated with the agent’s states
and response actions over time. However, it is very unusual in reality that both the
defender and the attacker have accurate observation about the other agent’s state.
By incorporating the POMG, this chapter contributes to the risk analysis literature
by further investigating how to assess and mitigate adversarial risk when both agents
are given inaccurate observations of the other agent’s state at each decision epoch.
In addition, there has been a growing literature that applies multi-objective optimiza-
tion models to homeland security problems, where the defender has to consider several
competing objectives simultaneously. Reference of Brown et al. (2012) has developed
a multi-objective single-stage Stackelberg game played between the defender and N
different types of attackers. This multi-objective security game can generate a Pareto
frontier for the defender facing various types of adversarial risks. The risk analysis
tool we have developed and use here considers multi-objectives for the defender in a
multiple period decision making environment.
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4.3 Risk Analysis Model
Our risk analysis model has two components: a game theoretic optimization model
and a consequence assessment model. The game theoretic optimization model ex-
plicitly describes the strategic interaction between the defender and the attacker over
time before an attack occurs. Once an attack occurs, the game stops and the conse-
quence assessment model determines the expected consequence of the attack. Hence,
the consequence assessment model serves as an input to the terminal reward of the
game model, and the generated consequence depends on the states of the defender
and the attacker at the time of the attack.
4.3.1 Consequence Assessment Model
The consequence assessment model calculates the expected impact of an attack on
the system, and this expected impact depends on the structure of the system and
the strategies and states of both the defender and attacker. For example, if a link
or a node of a supply chain network is disrupted, the consequence assessment model
should simulate the expected impact of this disruption on the entire system. We illus-
trate this concept using the liquid eggs production facility example we now introduce.
Figure 4.1 shows the liquid eggs production process. The shell eggs are transported
to the sanitizing and grading facility. After grading, well-graded eggs (grade AA, A
or B) are packed and transported to the markets, whereas off-graded eggs are trans-
ported to the breaking system. The resulting liquid eggs are collected by Collecting
Vats and stored in Raw Production Tanks. The Pasteurizers reduce the amount of
some toxins (e.g. population of micro-organisms) in the liquid eggs. After pasteur-
ization, the liquid eggs flow into the Finished Product Tank and are then packaged
for distribution. Figure 4.2 presents the simplified production process model found
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Figure 4.1: The liquid eggs processing system (Zhang, 2013)
Figure 4.2: Simplified liquid eggs processing system (Zhang, 2013)
in (Zhang, 2013).
The attacker may insert a toxin (e.g. botulinum) at various places (”targets”) in this
system, and the number of product units that contain a lethal amount of contami-
nant that leave the facility is the measure of consequence. We now define an attack
scenario.
Definition 4.1. An attack scenario is a 5-tuple (a,m, i, t, n), where a = toxin, m =
mass of the toxin inserted into the facility, i = the target where the toxin is inserted,
t = the time when the toxin is inserted, and n = whether the attacker can escape (0)
or not (1).
For example, the attack scenario (a0,m0, i0, t0, 0) is: deliver mass m0 ≥ 0 of toxin a0
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to target i0 at time t0 and then escape successfully.
The consequence of an attack depends on the mass of toxin inserted into the facility
(m), the target where the toxin is inserted (i) and the time of insertion (t). The con-
sequence is calculated by simulating the toxin contamination process in the facility
using the contamination model in Zhang (2013). In this example, we consider the
worst-time scenario using the tool developed in Zhang (2013), where we calculate the
worst possible consequence by determining the worst time the toxin can be inserted
into the production process. Let cons(m, i) be the consequence generated by inserting
m amount of toxin at target i at the worst possible time during the production process.
Figure 4.3 shows that the consequence of an attack at each target is non-decreasing
with increased mass of toxin. When the toxin mass is relatively high, the consequence
of an attack at Collecting Vat is higher than the consequence of an attack at the Raw
Product Tank, and the consequence of an attack at the Raw Product Tank is higher
than the consequence of an attack at the Finished Product Tank. These statements
are based on the fact that an attack upstream will affect downstream production.
However, when the mass of toxin is low, the pasteurizer can reduce the effectiveness
of the most of the toxin. Hence, the consequence of an attack at the Collecting Vat or
Raw Product Tank will be lower than at the Finished Product Tank. When the toxin
mass is sufficiently large, the entire process is contaminated; hence, the number of
contaminated packages approaches an upper bound. Among the four components of
the facility, the pasteurization process is the most effective in reducing or eliminating
toxin effectiveness and the component most difficult to attack. Thus, we eliminate
the pasteurization process as a possible target and only consider the Collecting Vat
(Target 1), Raw Product Tank (Target 2) and the Finished Product Tank (Target 3)
as possible targets.
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Figure 4.3: Consequence of an attack at different targets
4.3.2 Game Theoretic Optimization Model
The game theoretic optimization model is based on a partially observed Markov game,
which is comprised of:
4.3.2.1 State Spaces
The defender’s state space SD The defender’s state sD represents the opera-
tion status of the system. Each target i of the system can be in one of three states
{F,M,L}. State F is the high productivity, low-risk mitigation state for target i; M is
the medium productivity, medium-risk mitigation state for target i; L is the low pro-
ductivity, high-risk mitigation state for target i. Since there are three possible targets,
the defender’s state space is SD = {(sD1 , sD2 , sD3 ), sDi ∈ {F,M,L}, i = 1, 2, 3} ∪ {Att},
where sDi indicates that target i is in state s
D
i and Att indicates that an attack
has occurred. For example, (M,F, L) means the Collecting Vat is in the {medium
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productivity, medium-risk mitigation} state, the raw product rank is in the {high
productivity, low-risk mitigation} state, and the finished production tank is in the
{low productivity, high-risk mitigation} state. The size of the defender’s state space is
28. We assume the defender starts out and remains in state sD = {sD1 , sD2 , sD3 }, where
for all i, sDi ∈ {F,M,L} until an attack occurs. Once an attack occurs, the defender
immediately makes transition to the absorbing state Att. We have assumed that
the higher the production rate, the higher the level of productivity, and the less time
and resources available for mitigating risk, e.g., stopping production to test for toxins.
The attacker’s state space SA The attacker can be in the following states,
SA = {TF, IA,AM,AT,AAi, Ti, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}}, where state TF is the attack team
formation state; IA is the toxin ingredients acquisition state; AM is the toxin man-
ufacturing state; AT is the toxin transportation state; AAi is the state where the
attacker team is armed for an attack at target i. We assume that the attacker is
armed for attack (in AAi) once the toxin has been manufactured and delivered to the
target i. State Ti is the attacked state where an attack occurs at target i.
The state space of the system (S) is the Cartesian product of the defender’s state
space (SD) and the attacker’s state space (SA); i.e., S = SD × SA. The number of
elements in the state space of the system is 280. At decision epoch t, let sD(t) and
sA(t) be the defender’s and attacker’s states, respectively, and s(t) = {sD(t), sA(t)}.
4.3.2.2 Action Spaces
The defender’s action space AD The defender can either remain in its current
state or move to any other state; hence, the defender is able to choose any pre-
defined productivity level and risk mitigation level for each possible target of the
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{F,M,L}, i = 1, 2, 3 is 28.
The attacker’s action space AA We assume that an attack state Ti can only be
entered from state AAi for all i. The usual progression of states is therefore: TF to
IA to AM to AT to AAi. At each decision epoch, the attacker can choose to stay in
the current state, advance forward to the next state, or go back to a prior state. For
each action at any state except attacked states, there is a probability that the attacker
may return to the initial state TF caused by an operational error, interdiction of the
defender, etc.
At decision epoch t, let aD(t) and aA(t) be the defender’s and attacker’s actions, re-
spectively, and a(t) = {aD(t), aA(t)}. At each decision epoch, the number of elements
in the action space for the system is 84.
4.3.2.3 Observation Spaces
At decision epoch t, let zD(t) be the possibly inaccurate observation the defender
receives of the attacker’s state. Similarly, let zA(t) be the possibly inaccurate obser-
vation the attacker receives of the defender’s state. Let z(t) = {zD(t), zA(t)}.
The defender’s observation space ZD We assume the observation space of the
defender ZD = SA. Let the matrix of observation probabilities for the defender
be QD = {P (zD(t)|sA(t))}. We assume that the defender knows that targets i has
been attacked at the moment that target i is attacked. Similar to the definition of
observation accuracy in [29], we define QD = QD(εD), where εD ≥ 0 is a measure of
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defender’s observation accuracy (Ortiz, Erera and White, 2013), and
QD(zD|sA) =

1− εD if zD = sA, sA /∈ {T1, T2, T3}
σsAzDε
D ifzD 6= sA, sA /∈ {T1, T2, T3}
1 if zD = sA, sA ∈ {T1, T2, T3}
0 others
where σsAzD ≥ 0, σsAsA = 0 and
∑
zD σsAzD = 1 for all s
A. Defender’s observation
quality QD(εD1 ) is considered more accurate than that of Q
D(εD2 ) if ε
D
1 ≤ εD2 . The
defender has perfect observation about the attacker if QD = I, where I is the entity
matrix (i.e., εD = 0).
The attacker’s observation space ZA We assume the observation space of the
attacker ZA = SD. Let the matrix of observation probabilities for the attacker be
QA = {P (zA(t)|sD(t))}. Similar to QD, we define QA = QA(εA), where εA ≥ 0 is a
measure of attacker’s observation accuracy (Ortiz, Erera and White, 2013), and
QA(zA|sD) =

1− εA if zA = sD
σsDzAε
A ifzA 6= sD
where σsDzA ≥ 0, σsDsD = 0 and
∑
zA σsDzA = 1 for all s
D. Attacker’s observation
quality QA(εA1 ) is considered more accurate than that of Q
A(εA2 ) if ε
A
1 ≤ εA2 . The
attacker has perfect observation about the defender if QA = I, where I is the entity
matrix (i.e., εA = 0).
4.3.2.4 System dynamics
The dynamics of the defender is presented in Figure 4.4, and the dynamics of the
attacker is presented in Figure 4.5. The dynamics of the system P (s(t + 1), z(t +
1)|s(t), a(t)) is the Kronecker product of the defender’s dynamics and the attacker’s
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Figure 4.4: Dynamics of the defender
dynamics. Note, P (s(t + 1)|s(t), a(t)) =
∑
z(t+1) P (s(t + 1), z(t + 1)|s(t), a(t)) and
P (s(t+1), z(t+1)|s(t), a(t)) = QD(zD(t+1)|sA(t+1))QA(zA(t+1)|sD(t+1))P (s(t+
1)|s(t), a(t)).
4.3.2.5 Information patterns and policies
The information pattern for agent k ∈ {A,D} describes what agent k knows at each
decision epoch. Let the information pattern at time t of finite length τ for agent k be
Ik(t, τ) = {sk(t), · · · , sk(t− τ + 1), zk(t), · · · , zk(t− τ + 1), ak(t− 1), · · · , ak(t− τ)},
hence, Ik(t, τ) = {sk(t), zk(t), ak(t−1), Ik(t−1, τ−1)}. Let Ik(0) = {Ik(0, τ), yk(0)},
where Ik(0, τ) is given. Ik(t) = {sk(t), ..., sk(1), zk(t), ..., zk(1), ak(t−1), ..., ak(0), Ik(0)}
for t ≥ 1 and yk(t) is the stochastic array {P (I l(t, τ)|Ik(t))}, l 6= k, where yk(t) is
a “belief” array that indicates what agent k can infer about the other agent’s infor-
mation pattern, i.e., I l(t, τ), l 6= k, l, k ∈ {A,D}. We assume agents make decisions
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Figure 4.5: Dynamics of the attacker
on the basis of Ik(t, τ). Hence, a policy πk for agent k ∈ {A,D} is a mapping from
{Ik(t, τ)} to its set of available actions Ak. We focus on stationary policies without
loss of generality. Let Πk be the policy space of agent k, k ∈ {A,D}.
4.3.2.6 Rewards, criterion, and objective
Let the single-period reward for the defender and the attacker be rD(s, a) and rA(s, a),
respectively.
The defender’s reward rD(s, a) The defender has two objectives: rD1 (s, a) is
the productivity measure and rD2 (s, a) is the risk measure. For the productivity
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measure, let rD1 (s, a) =
∑
j P (j|sD, aD)[productivity of state j], which we note is
independent of the attacker state and action. For the vulnerability measure, let
rD2 (s, a) = −ρrA(s, a) where ρ > 0 is the coefficient that reflects the fact that the
consequence evaluation from the defender’s perspective may be different from that of
the attacker’s.
The attacker’s reward rA(s, a) The attacker has a single objective, and we as-
sume that rA(s, a) is non-zero only if the attacker attacks the system and then move
to Ti, i ∈ 1, 2, 3. If the attack is successful, then the reward is calculated by the conse-
quence assessment model cons(m, i). We assume that the mass of the toxin inserted
into the system (m) depends on the defender’s state at the time of the attack and
that for each target, P (m|F ) ≥ P (m|M) ≥ P (m|L). A failed attack may result in a
penalty cost (cp) to the attacker.
The criterion used by both agents for all objectives is the expected infinite horizon




where β is the discount factor such that 0 ≤ β < 1. The defender’s objectives are
to maximize long-run expected total discounted productivity of the food production
facility and to minimize the long-run expected total discounted consequence of an at-
tack. The attacker’s objective is to maximize the long-run expected total discounted
consequence generated by inserting toxin into the food production facility.
4.3.3 Solution procedure
We recall that the defender selects aD(t) at decision epoch t knowing ID(t, τ). Propo-
sition 2.1 in Chapter 2 shows that if the attacker knows the defender’s policy, then:
1. The attacker can base selection of an optimal policy at decision epoch t on sA(t)
and the array {P (ID(t, τ)|IA(t))}, rather than on IA(t).
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2. The optimal value of the attacker’s criterion depends on IA(t) only through
(sA(t), {P (ID(t, τ)|IA(t))}) and this value is convex and piecewise linear in
terms dependent on sA(t) and {P (ID(t, τ)|IA(t))}.
We remark that these results are due in part to the fact that the POMG, given a
finite-memory policy for the defender, can be transformed into a specially structured
partially observed Markov decision process (POMDP) for the attacker (see Chapter
2 for details).
The computational implications of Proposition 2.1 in Chapter 2 are of fundamental
importance. Proposition 2.1 guarantees that the determination of an optimal policy
and the resulting optimal criterion value for the attacker have finite representation
and hence are potentially computable, thus justifying the finite memory assumption
for the defender’s policy. We base the attacker’s action selection at decision epoch
t on {sA(t), {P (ID(t, τ)|IA(t))}}, rather than on IA(t), because: the number of ele-
ments in (sA(t), {P (ID(t, τ)|IA(t))}) depends on the fixed constant τ rather than on
t, the number of elements in IA(t) grows linearly in t, and t is unbounded over the
infinite planning horizon of the attacker’s criterion.
We observe that since the value function of the attacker vA can now depend on
(sA(t), {P (ID(t, τ)|IA(t))}), the domain space of vA is uncountable. However, since
vA is convex and piecewise linear, vA has the finite representation presented in Propo-
sition 2.1 in Chapter 2. Thus, we are able to compute an optimal policy for the
attacker, given a finite-memory policy for the defender (given restrictions on the di-
mensions of the state, action, and observation spaces).
The specially structured POMDP produces an optimal policy for the attacker that
has perfect memory. Proposition 2.2 in Chapter 2 requires that both the defender’s
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and attacker’s policies be finite-memory policies in order for the defender’s value
function to have finite representation. Thus, Proposition 2.2 in Chapter 2 justifies
approximating the attacker’s policy that results from solving the POMDP with a
finite-memory policy in order to insure potential computability.
We remark that the approach taken in Chapter 2 for determining policies for the de-
fender and attacker satisfies two equilibrium conditions presented in Chapter 2, one
for each agent. These equilibrium conditions guarantee that neither the defender nor
the attacker can improve its performance by deviating from the equilibrium condi-
tions. Treating vD as the fitness measure for each defender’s policy, a multi-objective
genetic algorithm (MOGA) is used in Chapter 2 to determine the defender and at-
tacker policy pairs that satisfies the equilibrium conditions.
Algorithm 1 presents high-level pseudo code for risk assessment determination. Pop-
ulation size and the number of iterations (design parameters) are initialized in line
1-2. Next, the population is initialized by filling it with randomly generated de-
fender policies, and the best defender policies are set to empty. Lines 5 - 17 describe
the steps taken by the multi-objective genetic algorithm. For each defender policy
ρD ∈ ΠD, the attacker’s best response policy πA = π∗(ρD) can be obtained by solving
a special structured POMDP (Line 7, using Proposition 2.1 in Chapter 2). The de-
fender’s value function vD(ρD, π∗(ρD)) can be determined, given a defender policy and
its attacker’s best response policy (Line 8, using Proposition 2.2 in Chapter 2). The
population of defender policies is sorted according to rankings and crowding distances
on the basis of vD (Line 10). The next generation of defender policies is determined
from the current generation of defender policies, the fitness measures of each cur-
rent generation defender policy, a crossover operator, and a mutation operator (Line
15 - 16). This procedure is repeated until the maximum number of iterations N is
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achieved, where N is set so that no significant improvement can be obtained (Line
5). The best defender policies are obtained from the pareto frontier of the last popu-
lation (Line 12 - 14). Detailed discussion of this algorithm can be found in Chapter 2.
Algorithm 1 Risk Assessment Algorithm
1: M ← PopulationSize
2: N ← MaxNumberOfIterations
3: population ← initPopulation()
4: BestPolicy ← ∅
5: while n < N do




10: population ← NonDominatedSorting(population)
11: n = n+ 1
12: if n == N then
13: BestPolicy←ParetoFrontier(population)
14: end if
15: population ← Crossover(population)
16: population ← Mutation(population)
17: end while
4.3.4 Special cases:
Determining vD(ρD, π∗(ρD))(ID(0)) for any given ρD ∈ ΠD as the fitness measure
is a crucial step in order to determine the most preferred defender policy in ΠD
(Lines 7 - 8). Since different information structures may affect the performances of
the defender and the attacker, we now investigate how the defender’s performance
vD(ρD, π∗(ρD))(ID(0)) changes over four different scenarios: completely observed case
(CO), completely observed defender-partially observed attacker (CDPA), partially ob-
served defender-completely observed attacker (PDCA), and partially observed case
(PO).
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4.3.4.1 Completely observed case (CO)
We assume that each agent can completely observe the state of the other agent, i.e.,
QD = I and QA = I. For any defender policy ρD ∈ ΠD, the resulting POMDP
becomes a MDP with 280 states and 3 actions for each state, which can be solved
efficiently by standard MDP solution procedures.
4.3.4.2 Completely observed defender-partially observed attacker (CDPA)
We assume that the attacker’s state can be completely observed by the defender; how-
ever, the defender’s state can only be partially observed by the attacker, i.e., QA 6= I
and QD = I. For any defender policy ρD ∈ ΠD, the resulting POMDP involves 280
underlying states, 28 observations, and 3 actions for each state.
4.3.4.3 Partially observed defender-completely observed attacker (PDCA)
We assume that the defender’s state is completely observed by the attacker; however,
the attacker’s state can only be partially observed by the defender, i.e., QA = I and
QD 6= I. This special case models the situation where the attacker knows more about
the defender than that the defender knows about the attacker, e.g., the defender is
a government agency with open records. For any defender policy ρD ∈ ΠD, the re-
sulting POMDP involves 2800 underlying states and 1 observation and 3 actions for
each state.
4.3.4.4 Partially observed case (PO)
We assume that the state of an agent cannot be accurately observed by the other
agent, i.e., QA 6= I and QD 6= I. For any defender policy ρD ∈ ΠD, the resulting




Each defender policy is encoded into an array of probability mass vectors. Each row
of this array is a probability mass vector over all possible defender actions for every
possible ID(t, τ). Let τ = 1 for computational simplicity. We assume all defender
policies are deterministic since deterministic policies are easy to implement and un-
derstand. The cardinality of the defender’s policy space is 28028 for all cases.
4.4.1 Runtime Results
For the multi-objective genetic algorithm, we assume a population size of 80, one
point crossover probability equal to 0.20, and a mutation rate of 7%. We let N = 50
(beyond which no significant improvement was determined in our numerical analy-
sis.) The solution procedure in Lin, Bean and White (2004) was implemented to
solve the specially structured POMDP for the attacker. We let the discount factor
β = 0.45 to ensure fast convergence. Parallel computing (openMP) was used on
a 3.80GHz quad-core (8 threads) CPU. The runtime results are summarized in Ta-
ble 4.1. We remark that the dynamic programming algorithm presented in Hansen,
Bernstein and Zilberstein (2004) can only solve a partially observed stochastic game
with 4 states and 2 actions and 2 observations per agent before it runs out of memory.
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Table 4.1: Runtime Results
CO CDPA PDCA PO
underlying state of POMDP 280 280 2800 2800
# of observations of POMDP 1 28 1 28
# of actions (for each state) 3 3 3 3
average runtime for POMDP(sec) 1.2 90.7 55.1 540.5
total runtime (hours) 0.34 24.4 17.3 149.2
4.4.2 Base Model Results
Figure 4.6 shows the improvement of the Pareto frontier from generation to genera-
tion for the partially observed case. We terminate the algorithm at the generation 50
beyond which no significant improvement has been found.

































Figure 4.6: Numerical result for partially observed case
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Table 4.2 lists the fitness measures of each policy on the Pareto frontier for generation
50, as displayed in Figure 4.6. All of these policies select the action “stopping produc-
tion and clean the system” when an attack is observed. Policy π1 is the ”least risk,
least productivity” policy, where the defender always selects state LLL. The other
non-dominated policies (π2, ...π23) consider the tradeoffs between expected long-run
total productivity and expected long-run risk.
We also compare the non-dominated policies with two baseline policies in Table 4.2.
Baseline policy b1 assumes that the defender always select state FFF , presumably
with the intent of maximizing productivity. The result shows that always selecting
FFF can significantly increase the vulnerability to an attack, which in turn reduces
the total long run productivity of the system and hence is dominated. Policies on
the Pareto frontier also dominate the baseline policy b2, which selects action randomly.
4.4.3 Value of Information
We present a comparison of the Pareto frontiers for the four different scenarios in
Figure 4.7. The defender’s performance depends on the relative observation accuracy
about the other agent. The defender’s performance in the CDPA case, where the
defender can completely observe the attacker but is only partially observed by the
attacker, is better than the other three cases. For the PDCA case, where the attacker
has accurate information about the defender’s state but the defender has inaccurate
observations of the attacker, the defender’s performance is worst in all the cases. The
performance of the defender for the completely observed case (CO) and the partially
observed case (PO) is bounded by the defender’s performance in the CDPA case
(from above) and the defender’s performance in the PDCA case (from below). In
our example, εD = 0.25 < εA = 0.3; hence, the defender’s observation matrix QD is
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Table 4.2: Non-dominated Policy in partially observed case



























slightly better than the attacker’s observation matrix QA, according to the definition
of observation accuracy presented in (Ortiz, Erera and White, 2013). The resulting
defender’s performance is similar for the completely observed case.
Figure 4.7: Pareto frontiers comparison for four special cases
We now analyze how information asymmetry can affect the defender policy and hence
the defender’s performance. We select the policy generating the largest measure of
productivity from the non-dominated policy set for each of the four special cases.
Clearly, the system is at risk when the defender’s (possibly inaccurate) observation
zD ∈ {AA1, AA2, AA3}. Given such an observation, we would anticipate that the
defender would immediately try to make transition into or remain in either state M
or L at target i. A defender policy can be viewed as a set of IF-THEN statements
of the form: IF the current data available to the defender is ID(t, τ), THEN the
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defender selects action aD. For X ⊂ {F,M,L}, let Ni(X) be the number of IF-
THEN statements that satisfy:
IF sDi (t) ∈ {F,M,L} and zD(t) = AAi, THEN select action āD such that
P (sDi (t+ 1) ∈ X|sDi (t), āD) ≥ P (sDi (t+ 1) ∈ X|sDi (t), aD),∀aD.
The ratios ofNi(L)/Ni(F,M,L) are given in Table 4.3(a), and the ratios ofNi(L,M)/Ni(F,M,L)
are given in Table 4.3(b), for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
For all AAi, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the ratios of Ni(L)/Ni(F,M,L) in PDCA are higher than
the ratios of Ni(L)/Ni(F,M,L) in CDPA. The observation AAi is accurate in CDPA
but inaccurate in PDCA. In order to mitigate the risk of an attack, the defender
is more likely to make transition into or remain in state L to overcome the addi-
tional uncertainty from the inaccurate observation. The ratios of Ni(L)/Ni(F,M,L)
in PDCA are also higher than the ratios of Ni(L)/Ni(F,M,L) in PO because: the
attacker also receives inaccurate observations about the defender’s state in PO, im-
posing an additional challenge to attack the system, which may reduce the likelihood
of an attack. Consequently, the defender may lower the ratio of Ni(L)/Ni(F,M,L) in
PO. It is interesting that the ratios of Ni(L)/Ni(F,M,L) in CDPA are higher than
the ratios of Ni(L)/Ni(F,M,L) in PO, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. A potential reason is that in
CDPA, only the attacker has the uncertainty about the observation and the attacker
knows this fact. Hence, the attacker can utilize this fact and affect the performance
of the defender. On the contrary, both the defender and the attacker have the un-
certainties from the inaccurate observations in PO. And the uncertainties from both
sides can cancel out when selecting action.
The result that the ratios of Ni(L)/Ni(F,M,L) in CO are higher than the ratios of
Ni(L)/Ni(F,M,L) in CDPA, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} in Table 4.3(a) shows that it is beneficial
for the defender to introduce the uncertainty of observation to the attacker, which
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Table 4.3: Defender policy in four cases when zD ∈ {AA1, AA2, AA3}, sD 6= Att
(a) the ratios of Ni(L)/Ni(F,M,L) when observation z
D = AAi, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
zD(t) CO CDPA PDCA PO
AA1 58.44% 55.56% 59.26% 44.44 %
AA2 51.85% 37.04 % 37.04% 33.33%
AA3 40.74% 29.63% 37.04% 25.93 %
(b) the ratios of Ni(L,M)/Ni(F,M,L) when observation z
D = AAi, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
zD(t) CO CDPA PDCA PO
AA1 70.37% 81.48% 74.07% 74.07%
AA2 66.67% 70.37% 70.37% 77.78%
AA3 62.96% 48.15% 55.56% 51.85%
can reduce the percentage of actions of making transition into or remain in state L.






, which is consistent with
the fact in Figure 4.3 that the target 1 is most vulnerable, target 2 is the next, and
target 3 is least vulnerable (The mass of toxin we considered is relatively large). The
defender is more likely to make transition into or remain in state L or M for more
vulnerable targets.
It is reasonable to consider that the system is at relatively low risk when the defender’s
(possibly inaccurate) observation zD ∈ {AT,AM, IA, TF}, suggesting that an attack
is not imminent. In such situations, we would imagine that the defender would prefer
state F at each target in order to improve the system productivity. We assume the
more targets are in state F , the more productive the system is. If the number of
targets in state F is fixed, the more targets are in state M , the more productive
the system is as well. Assume the productivity level of state (F, F, F ) is 100%. For
Y ⊂ {10j%, j = 1...10}, let M(Y ) be the number of IF-THEN statements that satisfy:
IF sD(t) 6= Att and zD(t) /∈ {AA1, AA2, AA3}, THEN select action ãD such that
P ( Productivity of sDi (t+ 1) ∈ Y |sDi (t), ãD) ≥ P ( Productivity of sDi (t+ 1) ∈
Y |sDi (t), aD),∀aD.
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The percentages of M(10k%) over M({10j%, j = 1...10}) are shown in Figure 4.8
for the four special cases, k = 2, ..., 10. Comparing CDPA to PDCA shows that
the percentage of M(10k%), k ≥ 6 in CDPA is greater than the percentage of
M(10k%), k ≥ 6 in PDCA. Hence, the defender is more willing to making transition
into or remain in states with high productivity level (≥ 60%) if its observation about
the attacker is accurate, which may improve the measure of productivity. The result
that the percentage of M(10k%), k ≥ 7 in CDPA is higher than M(10k%), k ≥ 7 in
PO also indicates the added value of improving the observation quality of the de-
fender about the attacker. Observe that M(10k%), k ≥ 7 in PDCA is greater than
M(10k%), k ≥ 7 in PO. We have shown that when the system is in high risk, the
ratios of Ni(L)/Ni(F,M,L) in PDCA are higher than the ratios of Ni(L)/Ni(F,M,L)
in PO, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Accordingly, the defender has to improve the percentage of se-
lecting a more productive state in order to maintain high productivity. The defender’s
policy balances the measures of productivity and risk.






























































































Figure 4.8: Defender policy in four cases when zD ∈ {AT,AM, IA, TF}, sD 6= Att
The observation quality associated with QD(εD1 ) is considered more accurate than
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that of QD(εD2 ) if ε
D
1 ≤ εD2 , where εD can be thought of a measure of observation er-
ror. We fix QA and further analyze how the defender’s performance can progressively
change as the observation accuracy improves. Figure 4.9 shows that the performance
of the defender tends to improve as εD decreases, which means improved information
accuracy about the attacker can improve the defender’s performance. The black stars
in Figure 4.9 represent the case where the defender’s observations provide no infor-
mation about the attacker’s state; i.e., the (i, j)th element of the probability matrix
QD is independent of i and hence all rows of QD are identical. Thus, the difference
between the black stars and any of the non-black shapes (triangle, circle, star, dot,
etc.) represents the added value of adaptively and intelligently making use of the
information content in the data the defender receives about the attacker’s state. The
case where only a priori static decision-making is made by the defender is equivalent
to the black stars and can be obtained through use of the standard PRA paradigm.
A theoretical analysis of value of information for the POMG can be found in Chapter
3.
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More vulnerable Less vulnerable
Figure 4.9: Value of information for the defender for various levels of accuracy of the
defender’s observation matrix QD(ε)
4.4.4 Dynamic Risk Mitigation
Assume how imminence of an attack increases as the attacker approaches any targets
of the system. We define
imminence of an attack =

0 if sA = TF
1 if sA = IA
2 if sA = AM
3 if sA = AT
4 if sA = AAi, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
5 if sA = Ti, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
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Figure 4.10 shows two sample paths simulated under two defender policies with
their corresponding best response attacker policies. The blue line is from the non-
dominated defender policy π2, and the red line is from the baseline policy b1 where the
defender always selects the highest productivity level for all targets. The plot shows
how the risk of the system can be mitigated over time as the defender and attacker
interact. The attacker progressively moves from TF to AT and then selects its most
preferred target. When the attacker is ready to attack a target, we labeled the name
of the target the attacker may attack, the defender’s state, and defender’s action.
Attacking Collecting Vat can generate the largest consequence if the risk mitigation
is low at every target. The red line shows that if the system is not well protected, the
system will be attacked at Collecting Vat quickly (e.g. the second peak), even if there
is a probability that the attacker may not be able to attack the system successfully
for every attempt (e.g. the first peak).
In contrast, under the non-dominated defender policy π2, the attacker may shift to
different targets while the defender is interacting with the attacker. For example, at
period 167, the attacker is ready to attack Collecting Vat. The defender makes tran-
sition from (M,F, F ) to (L,M,F ) to protect the system. Accordingly, the attacker
leaves Collecting Vat and moves to Raw Production Tank in the next period. At
period 343, the defender makes another transition from (L,M,M) to (M,L, F ) since
the attacker is ready to attack Raw Product Tank. At period 392, the defender fails
to recognize that the attacker is ready to attack Finished Product Tank because of
inaccurate information and an attack occurs. The defender is mitigating the risk by
dynamically making transitions among various states in response to the attacker’s
state and action. We observe that during these interactions, the target generating
the largest consequence may no longer be attacker’s best target to attack, and the
attacker may attack a target that is not very vulnerable. Hence, the defender can
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Figure 4.10: Sample paths simulated under two defender’s policies with their corre-
sponding best response attacker’s policies.
influence the attacker to attack a less vulnerable target. Figure 4.11 shows the per-
centages of attacks that occur at each target, based on 1000 simulations with policy
π2. Only 2.5% of the attacks occur at Collecting Vat, whereas the attacker will always
try to attack Collecting Vat under baseline policy b1.
Moreover, our model assumes that P (sA(t+1) ∈ {TF, IA}|sA(t), aA(t)) > 0,∀sA(t) /∈
{T1, T2, T3}, because for example the toxin may be no longer active or some team
members may be not available any more. Figure 4.10 shows that the attacker may
have to go back to low-risk states (e.g. TF or IA) while the attacker intends to move
to other targets in response to the defender’s action. Returning back to low-risk at-
tacker’s states extends the time until an attack, which in turn reduces the long-run
adversarial risk of the system.
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Figure 4.11: The distribution of attacked targets under policy π2
We show the distribution, as a function of the number of decision epochs, of the time
until an attack by a box plot in Figure 4.12, where 1000 sample paths were simu-
lated for each of four policies. The mean, standard derivation (std) and coefficient
of variation (CV) of the time until an attack are listed for each policy. Consistent
with Table 4.2, the average number of decision epochs until an attack under baseline
policy b1 is smaller than the average number of decision epochs until an attack under
the non-dominated policies. Note also that the interval between the 25% quantile
and the 75% quantile for policy b1 is smaller than the intervals for the other policies.
The spread (using std as a measure of spread) of the distribution of the number of
decision epochs until an attack is larger for policies under which the system is less
vulnerable (e.g. π1 or π5).
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Figure 4.12: Box Plot of the distribution of the time until an attack
4.4.5 Sensitivity Analysis
Since some parameters of the risk analysis tool are difficult to estimate, we now
examine how changes in critical parameter values can cause changes in defender per-
formance. Transition probabilities are the main unknown parameters in the model
since data on which to base estimates of these probabilities are in general unavailable
and hence assessment of these probabilities must often rely on expert opinion. Figure
4.13 shows the effect of varying transition probabilities on the Pareto frontier of the
defender. Among all of these probabilities, the performance of the defender is par-
ticularly sensitive to both the probability of successfully executing an attack and the
probability of successfully transporting the toxin to the target. In contrast, changes
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in the probabilities of successfully forming a team and acquiring ingredients to make
the contaminant cause little change in the performance of the defender. Hence, if
the defender can interdict an attack (thereby reducing the probability of successfully
transporting the toxin and the probability that an attack will be successful), then
investment in interdiction may be a top priority.
The penalty of an unsuccessful attack on the attacker (cp) is also difficult to estimate.
Intuitively, the higher this penalty, the lower the probability that the attack will want
to attack the system. Figure 4.14 supports this intuition and presents how the ratio
of cp to the worst consequence that the system can generate affects the defender’s
Pareto frontier. Thus, the Pareto frontier moves towards lower productivity and
higher vulnerability as this ratio decreases, and hence the higher cp is, the better it is
for the defender. There are two important thresholds: (1) the value of cp below which
the performance of the defender may be significantly decreased and the attacker tends
to attack more often because of a low cost of failure for the attacker; (2) the value of
cp above which the attacker is not willing to attack the system because of the high
penalty of failure. Hence, the defender should consider investing in raising cp to at
least above the latter ratio in order to protect the facility from attack. However,
investment greater than the latter ratio is unnecessary.
4.5 Conclusions
The intent of the risk assessment approach presented in this chapter is to describe
the strategic interaction between intelligent and adaptive agents with different objec-
tives over an at most countable number of decision epochs. This approach has two
components: (1) a consequence assessment tool and (2) a game theoretic optimiza-
tion model, where the consequence assessment tool serves as the input to the reward
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(1) Probability of moving to attacked state Ti from AAi


























(2) probability of moving to state AAi from toxin transportation state AT
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More vulnerable Less vulnerable
(3) probability of moving to toxin transportation state AT from manufacturing state
AM
























More vulnerable Less vulnerable
(4) probability of moving to manufacturing state AM from ingredient acquisition
state IA
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More vulnerable Less vulnerable
(5) probability of moving to ingredient acquisition state IA from team formation state
TF
Figure 4.13: Sensitivity analysis for transition probability
Figure 4.14: Penalty of unsuccessful attack cp
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function in the optimization model. Our risk analysis model can be used to describe
the situation where there are two agents, the defender and the attacker, who are
both intelligent and adaptive, have different objectives, have a sequence of decisions
to make over time, and have different data sets on which to base these decisions.
We considered several different variations of the model, where these variations were
distinguished by the quality of observation that one agent has of the other agent’s
current state. In particular, our approach provides decision support to the defender
on when and what action should be taken in order to achieve the defender’s possibly
multiple objectives.
To illustrate our approach, we considered the management of a simplified liquid egg
production plant, where: (1) the defender (e.g., the plant manager) has to balance
achieving two objectives, maximize plant productivity and minimize the expected con-
sequence of deliberate contamination, and (2) the attacker’s objective is to maximize
the total number of contaminated packaged units leaving the plant. Our preliminary
analysis shows that the system is under greatest risk if the attacker can accurately
observe the defender’s state and the defender can only inaccurately observe the at-
tacker’s state. We showed the impact on risk reduction of reducing the attacker’s
observation accuracy of the defender. We evaluated the defender’s performance, as a
function of the defender’s observation accuracy of the attacker, indicating the signifi-
cant value-added that observation accuracy can play in such situations. We performed
a sensitivity analysis to better understand what parameter values need careful assess-
ment and what parameters do not.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This dissertation examines a partially observed Markov game (POMG). The POMG
models a sequential decision making situation with multiple intelligent and adaptive
decision makers, each of which can choose actions that affect the dynamics of the
system and where these actions are selected on the basis of current but possibly inac-
curate state observations. The POMG is a new, relatively unexamined combination
of the stochastic game and the partially observe Markov decision process (POMDP).
This dissertation considers the case where there are two decision makers, a leader
and a follower. The leader is allowed to consider multiple objectives in selecting its
policy, and the follower considers a single objective in selecting its policy with com-
plete knowledge of and in response to the policy selected by the leader. The decision
makers can be cooperative, non-cooperative, or a mixture of both.
Chapter 2 develops a heuristic approach in order to generate a set of non-dominated
finite-memory policies from which one of two agents (the leader) can select a most pre-
ferred policy to control a dynamic system that is also affected by the control decisions
of the other agent (the follower). Each agent’s policy assumes that the agent knows its
current and recent state values, its recent actions, and the current and recent possibly
inaccurate observations of the other agent’s state. For each candidate finite-memory
leader policy, we assume the follower, fully aware of the leader policy, determines a
policy that optimizes the follower’s criterion. The leader-follower assumption allows
the POMG to be transformed into a specially structured, partially observed Markov
decision process that we use to determine the follower’s best response policy for a
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given leader policy. We then present a value determination procedure to evaluate the
performance of the leader for a given leader policy, based on which non-dominated set
of leader polices can be selected by existing heuristic approaches (e.g. Multi-objective
genetic algorithms).
We analyze how the value of the leader’s criterion changes due to changes in the
leader’s quality of observation of the follower in Chapter 3. We give conditions that
insure improved observation quality will improve the leader’s value function, assum-
ing that changes in the observation quality do not cause the follower to change its
policy. We show that discontinuities in the value of the leader’ criterion, as a function
of observation quality, can occur when the change of observation quality is significant
enough for the follower to change its policy. We present conditions that determine
when a discontinuity may occur and conditions that guarantee a discontinuity will
not degrade the leader’s performance.
This approach is applied in Chapter 4 to quantify the risk of a food production facility
to an intelligent and adaptive adversary intent on delivering a chemical or biological
toxin. We assume that both the manager (defender) of the food production facility
and the perpetrator (attacker) select actions at each of up to a countable number of
decision epochs on, in part, the basis of possibly inaccurate information about the
other agent. The defender’s objectives are to maximize expected facility productivity
and to minimize the expected consequence of food contamination. The attacker’s
objective is to maximize its reward, which combines the long-run expected total dis-
counted consequence of an attack with a penalty if the attack is unsuccessful. We
model this problem as a leader-follower, two agent partially observed Markov game,
a new model of dynamic risk analysis, and apply a new approach for analyzing risk.
We show how the risk can be mitigated as the result of strategic interaction between
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two agents over time. We investigate the impact of observation accuracy on facility
productivity and risk, thus providing a measure of the value of information, and per-
form a sensitivity analysis on key parameters.
The POMG developed so far assumes there are a single leader and a single follower.
Future research includes extending this model to the situation where there are mul-
tiple followers. Each of the followers may have different objectives and they may
not share the same information pattern. The followers can communicate with each
other and hence collaborate or possibly compete with each other. The objective and
information pattern for the leader can also be different from those of the followers.
This framework can model many real applications. For example, it can describe the
situation where the defender protects the infrastructure against multiple adversaries,
or the situation where the manager leads a team to complete a complex task in the
business environment, where each member of the team has a different objective func-
tion and a different information pattern. It will be interesting to determine the value
of improving the ability of the followers to communicate with each other in a collab-
orative game, as well as the value of disrupting communication between followers in
a security application.
Furthermore, leader-follower assumption may not be applicable in many applications.
The future research should consider different strategic relationship among agents and
analyze how the strategic relationship can affect the performance of each agent. For
example, the agents may select policies at the same time or the role of leader and
follower may be switched.
In addition, the risk of an intentional attack is just one of many types of risk. Our
risk assessment tool can model a variety of types of risk, including risk of intentional
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or unintentional contamination for food products, disruptions due to tier 3 or 4 in-
gredient supplier failure, carrier failure, and natural hazards. The multi-objective
characteristic of our model allows us to consider multiple risks simultaneously by
treating each risk measure as a separate objective. This method has been used to













P F (1) =
0.2232 0.7768
0.5131 0.4869




• reward structure rk(sL, sF , aL, aF ), k ∈ {L, F}:
rF =
(1L, 1F )a (1
L, 2F )a (2
L, 1F )a (2
L, 2F )a

(1L, 1F )s 3.9855 1.2631 3.8957 4.9839
(1L, 2F )s 8.3138 8.6463 4.9014 5.2923
(2L, 1F )s 1.8500 7.6665 8.8690 9.0970
(2L, 2F )s 5.0079 5.6435 9.0505 5.7860
(i) example(a):
rL =
(1L, 1F )a (1
L, 2F )a (2
L, 1F )a (2
L, 2F )a

(1L, 1F )s 6.8156 8.2357 8.9439 9.5346
(1L, 2F )s 4.6326 1.7501 5.1656 5.4088
(2L, 1F )s 2.1216 1.6357 7.0270 6.7973
(2L, 2F )s 0.9852 6.6599 1.5359 0.3656
(ii) example(b):
rL =
(1L, 1F )a (1
L, 2F )a (2
L, 1F )a (2
L, 2F )a

(1L, 1F )s 7.9466 7.5195 6.7120 3.9076
(1L, 2F )s 5.7739 2.2867 7.1521 8.1614
(2L, 1F )s 4.4004 0.6419 6.4206 3.1743




(1L, 1F )a (1
L, 2F )a (2
L, 1F )a (2
L, 2F )a

(1L, 1F )s 8.0549 8.8651 9.7868 0.5962
(1L, 2F )s 5.7672 0.2867 7.1269 6.8197
(2L, 1F )s 1.8292 4.8990 5.0047 0.4243
(2L, 2F )s 2.3993 1.6793 4.7109 0.7145
(iv) example(d):
rL =
(1L, 1F )a (1
L, 2F )a (2
L, 1F )a (2
L, 2F )a

(1L, 1F )s 4.9417 8.9092 0.3054 9.0472
(1L, 2F )s 7.7905 3.3416 7.4407 6.0987
(2L, 1F )s 7.1504 6.9875 5.0002 6.1767
(2L, 2F )s 9.0372 1.9781 4.7992 8.5944
(v) example(e):
rL =
(1L, 1F )a (1
L, 2F )a (2
L, 1F )a (2
L, 2F )a

(1L, 1F )s 6.3114 9.9685 4.3000 0.6463
(1L, 2F )s 8.5932 5.5354 4.9181 4.3618
(2L, 1F )s 9.7422 5.1546 0.7104 8.2663
(2L, 2F )s 5.7084 3.3068 8.8774 3.9453
(vi) example(f):
rL =
(1L, 1F )a (1
L, 2F )a (2
L, 1F )a (2
L, 2F )a

(1L, 1F )s 0.8348 8.9075 9.2831 8.6271
(1L, 2F )s 6.2596 9.8230 5.8009 4.8430
(2L, 1F )s 6.6094 7.6903 0.1698 8.4486
(2L, 2F )s 7.2975 5.8145 1.2086 2.0941
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The parameters in Example 3.2 are:

















































(1L,1F )s,(1L,1F )a 0.2371 0.1766 0.1741 0.1291 0.1268 0.0990 0.0479 0.0095
(1L,1F )s,(1L,2F )a 0.2371 0.1766 0.1741 0.1291 0.1268 0.0095 0.0479 0.0990
(1L,1F )s,(2L,1F )a 0.2371 0.1766 0.1741 0.1291 0.0990 0.0479 0.0095 0.1268
(1L,1F )s,(2L,2F )a 0.2371 0.1766 0.1741 0.1291 0.0479 0.0990 0.0095 0.1268
(1L,2F )s,(1L,1F )a 0.2371 0.1766 0.1741 0.1291 0.0095 0.0990 0.0479 0.1268
(1L,2F )s,(1L,2F )a 0.2371 0.1766 0.1741 0.1268 0.0095 0.0990 0.0479 0.1291
(1L,2F )s,(2L,1F )a 0.2371 0.1766 0.1741 0.0990 0.0095 0.1268 0.0479 0.1291
(1L,2F )s,(2L,2F )a 0.2371 0.1766 0.1268 0.1291 0.0095 0.0990 0.0479 0.1741
(2L,1F )s,(1L,1F )a 0.2371 0.1766 0.1268 0.0990 0.0095 0.1291 0.0479 0.1741
(2L,1F )s,(1L,2F )a 0.2371 0.1766 0.0990 0.1268 0.0095 0.1291 0.0479 0.1741
(2L,1F )s,(2L,1F )a 0.2371 0.1766 0.0479 0.1291 0.0095 0.1268 0.0990 0.1741
(2L,1F )s,(2L,2F )a 0.2371 0.1766 0.0479 0.1268 0.0095 0.1291 0.0990 0.1741
(2L,2F )s,(1L,1F )a 0.2371 0.1766 0.0095 0.1268 0.0479 0.1291 0.0990 0.1741
(2L,2F )s,(1L,2F )a 0.2371 0.1741 0.0095 0.1291 0.0479 0.1268 0.0990 0.1766
(2L,2F )s,(2L,1F )a 0.2371 0.1741 0.0095 0.1268 0.0479 0.1291 0.0990 0.1766
(2L,2F )s,(2L,2F )a 0.2371 0.1291 0.0095 0.1268 0.0479 0.1741 0.0990 0.1766
,
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(1L,1F )s,(1L,1F )a 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.12 0.13 0.07 0.05 0.07
(1L,1F )s,(1L,2F )a 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.12 0.13 0.02 0.04 0.13
(1L,1F )s,(2L,1F )a 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.12 0.11 0.05 0.01 0.15
(1L,1F )s,(2L,2F )a 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.12 0.06 0.10 0.01 0.15
(1L,2F )s,(1L,1F )a 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.12 0.02 0.10 0.05 0.15
(1L,2F )s,(1L,2F )a 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.11 0.02 0.10 0.04 0.17
(1L,2F )s,(2L,1F )a 0.21 0.17 0.18 0.10 0.01 0.11 0.04 0.18
(1L,2F )s,(2L,2F )a 0.21 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.20
(2L,1F )s,(1L,1F )a 0.21 0.17 0.14 0.09 0.01 0.13 0.05 0.20
(2L,1F )s,(1L,2F )a 0.21 0.17 0.11 0.12 0.01 0.13 0.05 0.20
(2L,1F )s,(2L,1F )a 0.21 0.17 0.06 0.13 0.01 0.12 0.10 0.20
(2L,1F )s,(2L,2F )a 0.21 0.17 0.06 0.12 0.01 0.13 0.10 0.20
(2L,2F )s,(1L,1F )a 0.21 0.17 0.02 0.12 0.05 0.13 0.10 0.20
(2L,2F )s,(1L,2F )a 0.21 0.16 0.02 0.12 0.045 0.13 0.10 0.215
(2L,2F )s,(2L,1F )a 0.21 0.16 0.02 0.11 0.04 0.135 0.10 0.225
(2L,2F )s,(2L,2F )a 0.21 0.13 0.01 0.13 0.03 0.165 0.10 0.225





RF (dF (t, τ), πL, ρF ) = [2.0944,−10, 9.1798,−10, 9.1768,−10, 9.1858,
− 10,−10, 9.3521,−10, 9.3522,−10, 9.3620,−10, 2.8030]
RF (dF (t, τ), πL, πF ) = [3.3540, 10,−9.3656, 10,−9.3656, 10,−9.3656, 10,
10,−9.3656, 10,−9.3656, 10,−9.3656, 10,−9.3656]
RF (dF (t, τ), ρL, ρF
′
) = −∞, ∀ρF ′ ∈ ΠF
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RL(dF (t, τ), πL, ρF ) = [2.9118, 2.8947, 2.8725, 2.8715, 2.7401, 2.7174, 2.4442, 2.4008,
1.8971, 1.6406, 1.4561, 0.8355, 0.4728, 0.4257, 0.3810, 0.2926]
RL(dF (t, τ), πL, πF ) = [2.0224, 1.9607, 1.9596, 1.9568, 1.9523, 1.9479, 1.7010, 1.6948,
1.2183, 0.9849, 0.8006, 0.4137, 0.3452, 0.2608, 0.2545, 0.0806]










P F (1) =
0.2593 0.7407
0.6356 0.3644




• reward structure rk(sL, sF , aL, aF ), k ∈ {L, F}:
rF = rL =
(1L, 1F )a (1
L, 2F )a (2
L, 1F )a (2
L, 2F )a

(1L, 1F )s 9.3942 3.5084 6.4232 0.2711
(1L, 2F )s 4.1759 5.0135 9.2925 2.2993
(2L, 1F )s 2.9319 0.8495 8.3598 6.4256










P F (1) =
0.8815 0.1185
0.6147 0.3853





• reward structure rk(sL, sF , aL, aF ), k ∈ {L, F}:
rF = rL =
(1L, 1F )a (1
L, 2F )a (2
L, 1F )a (2
L, 2F )a

(1L, 1F )s 6.0012 8.8066 5.3363 4.4058
(1L, 2F )s 9.8051 0.1065 0.6272 0.9891
(2L, 1F )s 7.6433 5.7154 5.6470 1.2712










P F (1) =
0.3594 0.6406
0.0007 0.9993




• reward structure rk(sL, sF , aL, aF ), k ∈ {L, F}:
rF = rL =
(1L, 1F )a (1
L, 2F )a (2
L, 1F )a (2
L, 2F )a

(1L, 1F )s 3.3740 8.2159 1.6372 3.5419
(1L, 2F )s 7.5482 8.1603 5.8402 3.2979
(2L, 1F )s 7.0649 8.1617 9.0912 7.2706










P F (1) =
0.7036 0.2964
0.5885 0.4115





• reward structure rk(sL, sF , aL, aF ), k ∈ {L, F}:
rF = rL =
(1L, 1F )a (1
L, 2F )a (2
L, 1F )a (2
L, 2F )a

(1L, 1F )s 7.3817 6.7738 4.4108 0.6868
(1L, 2F )s 9.0358 7.3192 3.5113 3.4176
(2L, 1F )s 7.2087 8.9864 9.3087 0.1376
(2L, 2F )s 6.4387 9.3377 9.5397 3.9611
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